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ATTORNEY INVESTMENT IN CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: THE AGENT ORANGE EXAMPLE

When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer
should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of
the legal system and the legal profession.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 9-2

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the risk and expense involved in mounting
class actions has spurred a search for funding sources beyond the
standard contingency fee arrangement often used to finance civil

cases. Complex class litigation, distinguished by complicated or
novel issues and multiple litigants, arises often in the mass tort,
environmental, antitrust, securities, and product liability areas. Attorneys and plaintiffs have been forced to search for new sources
of capital to finance the high cost of these suits. One controversial

funding source has been speculative investment in class action
lawsuits by the class attorneys themselves. The Agent Orange case

provides a model for the examination of this type of investment.'

1. The Agent Orange case concerned the exposure of military personnel to phenoxy
herbicides (collectively known as "Agent Orange") contained in defoliants sprayed over
Vietnamese jungles. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 731
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), afd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
The veterans and their families, suffering unexplained illnesses which they believed to
have been caused by exposure to Agent Orange, filed suit against various chemical manufacturers and the United States government. As Peter Schuck describes it:
The case is actually a consolidation into one class action of more than 600
separate actions originally filed by more than 15,000 named individuals throughout the United States, and almost 400 individual cases not included in the class
action ("opt-out" cases). The parties in these consolidated actions consist of
some 2.4 million Vietnam veterans, their wives, children born and unborn, and
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In the Agent Orange class action,2 "investor-attorneys" joined
the Plaintiffs' Management Committee (PMC) and advanced money
to bankroll the overextended plaintiffs' attorneys. In return, the
members of the PMC agreed that the investors would receive three
times their original contribution prior to distribution of any settlement or judgment. The unique roles of the attorneys in this situation as advocates, officers of the court, and investors suggest conflicts which are compounded by the nature of class action litigation.
Class actions, with their representative plaintiffs, court-appointed counsel, and supervisory judges, differ significantly from the
ordinary lawsuit. The prerequisites to class actions found in the
3 demand a showing that the class
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will be represented adequately by a typical plaintiff(s),4 and com-

petent counsel, who will litigate common issues on behalf of all
class members.' The rules require active supervision by the court
soldiers from Australia and New Zealand; a small number of civilian plaintiffs;
seven (originally twenty-four) corporate defendants; and the United States government . . . . The plaintiffs are represented by a network of law firms that
numbered almost 1,500 by May, 1984 ....
It has been estimated that the
defendants spent roughly $100 million merely to prepare for the trial, utilizing
hundreds of lawyers and corporate staff in their Herculean effort.
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 4-5 (enlarged ed. 1987).
2. The district court actually certified two types of class actions in December 1983. A
class was certified under Rule 23(b)(3) on the basis of common issues of general causation and the military contractor defense, 100 F.R.D. at 721-24, and a "limited fund"
class was certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) for punitive damage claims. Id. at 732. The
second class was comprised of all persons in the Rule 23(b)(3) class. Id. For the purposes
of this Note, Agent Orange will be referred to as a single class action.
3. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
4. The prerequisite concerning representation has been described as follows:
This prerequisite embodies concerns which fall into two categories: that the
representatives and their attorneys will competently, responsibly and vigorously
prosecute the suit, and that the relationship of the representative parties' interests to those of the class are such that there is not likely to be divergence in
viewpoint or goals in the conduct of the suit.
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 449 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978).
5. Careful attention to the prerequisites of Rule 23 is "indispensable." East Texas Mo-
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on behalf of the class, recognizing the potential prejudice to the
interests of the absent class members which is inherent in the class
action format.' Many class actions involve contingency fee arrangements, which are often the only way plaintiffs with small
claims can afford to pursue them.'
In the Agent Orange case, the potential weaknesses in the
representative character of class litigation-multiple litigants bound
by the decisions of their relatively autonomous attorneys-were
exacerbated, or perhaps exploited, by the financial investments of
those attorneys. The original cases were conceived and filed by
attorneys inexperienced in class actions or complex litigation!
Well-heeled investor-attorneys became interested in the case only
after the defendants were seriously considering settlement, despite
the profound difficulties in the plaintiffs' case.' Eventually the case
did settle," after taxing the resources of the court," costing the
defendants millions of dollars in legal fees 2 and incalculable negative publicity, and producing a paltry recovery for some of the
original class members. 3
In the view of the trial judge in the Agent Orange case, the
net effect of attorney investment on the settlement was negligible. 4 Arguably, however, attorney investment was the factor
tor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (vacating a decision imposing class-wide liability in an employment discrimination case).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be
Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions); (d) (Orders
in Conduct of Actions); (e) (Dismissal or Compromise).
7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIrIrY EC 2-20 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
8. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing litigators' backgrounds).
9. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114. S. Ct. 1125 (1994) (summarizing these weaknesses: obstacle of the
military contractor defense, lack of epidemiological evidence of general causation, difficulty of proving individual exposure to Agent Orange, problem of proving individual causation).
10. The settlement arrived at in May, 1984 established a fund of $180 million.
SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 5.
11. See id. at 82 (discussing the appointment of Sol Schreiber as special master for
discovery); id. at 122 (explaining that Schreiber was replaced by magistrate Shira
Scheindlin); id, at 144-46 (noting the "highly unusual if not unprecedented" appointment
of three masters for settlement: Kenneth Feinberg, David I. Shapiro, and Leonard Garment).
12. See id. at 5 (estimating defendants' pre-trial legal expenses at $100 million).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 318-19 (discussing the inadequacy of the
plaintiffs' recovery).
14. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1461 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (denying motion to set aside fee-sharing agreement of plaintiffs' counsel), rev'd,
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which tipped the balance to allow an underfinanced, inadequately
prepared case to determine the outcome of thousands of injured
plaintiffs. t5 In hindsight, the safeguards existing in Rule 23 to
protect absent class members were insufficient to protect them from
the serious conflict of interest created by their attorneys' speculative investment in the case.
This Note uses the Agent Orange scenario to explore the ethical and practical issues involved in financing class action litigation
by speculative attorney investment. The background section defines
traditional prohibitions on the financing of lawsuits by unrelated
parties: champerty, maintenance, and barratry. 6 After describing
the rationale and costs associated with complex litigation in the
class action format,' the Note discusses traditional methods of
calculating attorney fees in that context.'8 Part II.F reviews the attorney investment in the Agent Orange case in some detail. The
discussion incorporates relevant provisions of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The Note concludes by endorsing disclosure of financial
and compensation arrangements as part of the class certification
process and suggesting that the plaintiffs' counsel be required to
consult with a sampling of the class 9 beyond the named representatives on major issues affecting the litigation. Further, when certifying a class, the court should appoint an independent guardian ad

818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
15. Two class actions were filed in Texas courts in 1989 and 1990 by plaintiffs whose
injuries allegedly resulted from exposure to Agent Orange but did not become apparent
until after the settlement of May, 1984. The plaintiffs claimed their right to due process
was violated when future claims were prohibited by the 1984 settlement. Attorneys General Join Agent Orange Appeal, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 14, 1994, at 5. The cases were removed
to federal court, but the claims of two civilian plaintiffs were remanded to state court, in
part on the grounds that they were not part of the original Agent Orange class. Ryan v.
Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aft'd, In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994). The
claims of the remaining plaintiffs, veterans and family members, were dismissed as barred
by the original settlement. Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 918-20. (Benton Musslewhite appeared
for the plaintiffs before the Second Circuit. Musslewhite was a member of the nine-man
Plaintiffs' Managment Committee which settled the original Agent Orange case. See infra
note 136).
16. See infra part II.A-B.
17. See infra part II.C-D.
18. See infra part II.E.
19. See Michael D. Ricciuti, Note, Equity and Accountability in the Reform of Settlement Procedures in Mass Tort Cases: The Ethical Duty to Consult, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICs 817, 853 (1988) (proposing a "consultation unit" to act as the client in dealing
with class counsel). See infra note 365 for further discussion of the consultation unit.
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litem, compensated by the plaintiffs' attorneys at the direction of
the court, to protect the interests of absent class members in situations analogous to Agent Orange."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Prohibitions
on Maintenance, Champerty, and Barratry
The common law developed several categories of offenses
aimed at discouraging the involvement of third parties in legal disputes. Maintenance is "[a]n officious intermeddling in a lawsuit by
a non-party by maintaining, supporting or assisting either party,
with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the litigation.""1
A companion offense to maintenance, barratry is "frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise."' Champerty is a more specific form of maintenance: "[a]
bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the
stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration for receiving
part of any judgment proceeds."
In the medieval era, maintenance agreements primarily occurred
in connection with actions to recover land.' Success meant that
the investor became a joint owner of the land,' which allowed
wealthy families to amass "little principalities" by maintaining the
suits of their retainers.' In addition to popular resentment of such
aggrandizement, the medieval Christian church objected to litigation
on principle, especially in the secular courts.27 According to Professor Max Radin, "[s]ubconsciously, [the] basis [of the offense of
champerty] was the fundamental distrust of legal procedure and of

20. A guardian ad litem could be appointed by the court pursuant to its authority under Rule 23(d)(3) or the guardian mechanism could be instituted as a local rule under
Rule 83. Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for
a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 326 n.104

(1985).
21. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 954 (6th ed. 1990).

22. Id. at 150.
23. Id. at 231.
24. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REv. 48, 60 (1935) (tracing the roots of champerty from the early Greeks and Romans through the Middle Ages
and the modem era).
25. Id. at 60.
26. Id. at 66.
27. Id.
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lawyers."2
Ancient restrictions on maintenance and champerty have been
preserved in modem codes of legal ethics, including the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility29 and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.3" The codes preserve the notion that allowing
third parties to bring claims encourages needless litigation.3 Some
critics contend that these restrictions, particularly those on champerty, are outdated in modem litigation settings.32 Others recommend
that certain ethics rules be "jettisoned" in class action and derivative litigation, observing that "rules on solicitation, maintenance,
fee-splitting and the appearance of impropriety have virtually no
current force or rationale in the large-scale, small-claim setting and
are routinely circumvented with only the thinnest veneer of compli33
ance."
28. Id.
29. The Model Code provides as follows:
(A) A
subject
(1)
(2)

lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may:
Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses.
Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his
client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client
remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at DR 5-103. See also Daniel C. Cox, Comment, Lawsuit
Syndication: An Investment Opportunity in Legal Grievances, 35 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 153,
161 (1990) ("The core of the antichamperty rules exist [sic] today in the Code of Professional Responsibility." (footnote omitted)).
30. The Model Rules state:
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter,
and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e) (1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
31. See Cox, supra note 29, at 162 (noting that both the Model Rules and the Model
Code reflect a desire to avoid "excessive" or "unwarranted" litigation).
32. See id. at 153 & n.3 (endorsing lawsuit syndication, especially in antitrust, patent,
and copyright infringement cases). See generally Susan L. Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits:
Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 485 (1992) (asserting
that maintenance and champerty are outdated and that syndication actually improves access
to the justice system).
33. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
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Contingency Fees as an Accepted Form of Champerty

Critics of restrictions on champerty and related offenses point
out that the typical contingency fee has obvious champertous implications.' Contingent fee arrangements, in which the attorney accepts the case in return for a percentage of any award or settlement, are permitted by current American codes of legal ethics."
Indeed, many- members of the bar rely on contingent fees to make

a living.36 Contingency fees have been viewed as a way for plaintiffs with limited means to sidestep the "American rule" which, in
the absence of a specific statute or common law exception to the
contrary, requires each party to litigation to pay its own attorneys'
fees.37 The Model Code notes that contingent fees often "provide

Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991) (arguing that the theory of existing regulatory structures errs
in treating entrepreneurial litigation according to a standard litigation model, and recommending rules to control agency costs which recognize that the attorney rather than the
ostensible client controls the litigation).
34. See, e.g., Janet E. Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B): Champerty
and Class Actions, 36 Bus. LAW. 1667, 1669-70 (1981) (asserting that "illegal champerty
is a necessity in representational suits").
35. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at EC 2-20 ("Contingent fee arrangements in civil
cases have long been commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce
claims."); MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule 1.5(c):
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by
paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the
recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the
contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the
lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of
the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and
the method of its determination.
Contingent fees are banned in most foreign countries to avoid frivolous litigation and
attorney-client conflicts of interest. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
ETHics 768 (1992).
36. Findlater, supra note 34, at 1669.
37. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(holding that only Congress has the authority to make exceptions to the American rule).
Congress has adopted more than 150 fee-shifting statutes in specific areas, such as civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983)
(reiterating that, absent a statutory exception, each party pays its own fees). See Kenneth
R. Feinberg & John S. Gomperts. Attorneys' Fees in the Agent Orange Litigation: Modifying the Lodestar Analysis for Mass Tort Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
613, 615 & nn. 14-19 (1986) (listing various exceptions to the American rule).
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the only practical means by which one having a claim against
another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of
a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim."3 In the process of
ensuring access to the courts, the successful attorney also conveniently produces a res from which his or her fee may be paid.39
Apart from the contingency fee, courts have developed two
exceptions to the "American rule:" the "bad faith exception" and
the "common fund" doctrine. Under the first, bad faith or disobedience of a court order can subject a party to liability for the
opponent's attorneys' fees.' Under common fund theory, the efforts of the attorney and plaintiff(s) produce a fund for the class."
The attorney's fees, for which the named plaintiff normally would
be individually responsible under the American rule, are paid out
of the fund.42 The class members thus contribute to the costs of
the litigation from their recovery, and are not unjustly enriched at
the expense of the named plaintiff.43
In contingency cases, the attorney becomes a "joint venturer"'
with the client. In this capacity, the plaintiffs attorney has also

38. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at EC 2-20.
39. Id.
40. Feinberg & Gomperts, supra note 37, at 615.
41. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintij's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic. Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 670 n.2 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs
Attorney].
42. See id. at 669 n.1 (describing the plaintiffs' attorney as a '"bounty hunter' . . . a
profit-motivated entrepreneur who is relatively unconstrained by the interests of any specific client").
43. Id. The common fund doctrine was articulated by the Supreme Court in Boeing
Co. v. Van Gemert:
[T]his Court has recognized consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client
is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole. The common-fund doctrine reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity, and it
stands as a well-recognized exception to the general principle that requires
every litigant to bear his own attorney's fees. The doctrine rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to
its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's expense. Jurisdiction
over the fund involved in the litigation allows a court to prevent this inequity
by assessing attorney's fees against the entire fund, thus spreading fees proportionately among those benefited by the suit.
444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Trustees of the Int'l Improv. Fund
v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1881) (approving equitable reimbursement of litigation expenses).
44. Coffee, Understanding the PlaintisAttorney, supra note 41, at 670 n.2.
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been described as a "bounty hunter" 45 or, more grandly, as a "private attorney general."' The prospect of securing a significant
portion of the plaintiff's recovery is designed to give attorneys an
incentive to accept meritorious cases which plaintiffs otherwise

would be unlikely to pursue on their own. Additionally, a contingent fee in a group situation can save clients money over tradi-

tional individual representation agreements, in which the attorney
can charge the same percentage of recovery to all plaintiffs regardless of the common issues prepared.47
Contingency fees translate into shared incentives and shared
risks for attorney and client, but their interests are not identical.4"

For example, the attorney may want to settle early for a guaranteed
fee rather than invest additional hours in the case. Those hours
might result in a marginally greater recovery for the client or,
alternatively, in the loss of the case altogether. Use of the contingent fee in the context of class actions has also provoked much
judicial criticism. 0 The Supreme Court has recognized nonetheless
that the contingent fee remains a device of primary importance for
less than wealthy plaintiffs to secure redress of claims in the
courts.5'
C. Economic Rationalefor Class Actions in Large-Scale
Litigation with Small Individual Recoveries
Class actions also provide a procedural vehicle to maintain

lawsuits when individual plaintiffs cannot or will not risk litigation

45. Cf id. at 669 n.l (observing that the plaintiff's attorney first functioned as a
"bounty hunter" in the context of derivative litigation).
46. Id. (discussing the increasing use of the term "private attorney general" to describe
the role of the plaintiffs' attorney in derivative actions and mass tort cases).
47. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 881 n.11
(1987) [hereinafter Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation] (discussing the
"lodestar formula" which fixes attorney fees in class actions according to time actually
spent on the case). See also infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972) ("There can be no
blinking at the fact that the interests of the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit and
of his attorney are by no means congruent.").
49. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 17-18 (noting an attorney may determine
his or her time investment based on the expected return).
50. See infra notes 322-26 and accompanying text.
51. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338
(1980) (noting the increase in litigation as a result of contingent fee agreements and the
role played by those arrangements in vindicating the rights of individuals with small
claims).
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to secure recovery for their claims, usually because the anticipated
individual recovery is too small to justify the projected costs. 2
Litigation on behalf of a group neatly solves the "free rider" problem, in which a second plaintiff receives the benefit of an action
initiated and financed by the first.53 Without a class action, the
aggregate costs of individual injuries to society would remain unredressed.5'
Class actions enable both plaintiffs and defendants to concentrate their resources to obtain higher-quality representation, reduce
the burden on witnesses and courts, and level the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants. 5 In this way, class actions facilitate private enforcement of the law56 and conserve judicial resources 57 where other alternatives, such as joinder 8 and intervention5 9 of additional parties would be overwhelmingly cumbersome
and costly." In cases seeking the structural reform of an institution, class proceedings allow the action to focus on the practices of
the institution as a whole rather than on individual issues requiring
separate litigation.6' The certification of a class permits such suits
to proceed and requires judicial approval of any settlement, even if

individual claims become moot.62
From the attorney's point of view, class actions gain more
negotiating leverage, higher fees, and easier access to sources of

52. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 8 (asserting that without a class action device plaintiffs would have no incentive to pursue claims for minor injuries).
53. See id. at 8 n.5 ("Freeriding, as the name implies, simply refers to a situation
where a person can obtain a benefit (or avoid a cost) without paying for it.")
54. See Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases under Rule 23(b)(1), 96
HARV. L. REv. 1143, 1144 n.3 (1983) (stating that while individual claims may be small
there may be a significant loss to society which should be redressed).
55. See id. at 1144-46.
56. See Deposit Guar. Natl. Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339
(1980) (A class action is "an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied
by the regulatory action of government.").
57. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) ("[T]he classaction device saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue
potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under
Rule 23." (quoting Califano v. Yamasake, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979))).
58. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19 (joinder of persons needed for just adjudication); FED. R. COv.
P. 20(a) (permissive joinder of parties).
59. FED. R. Ctv. P. 24.
60. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 8-9.
61. Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1186
(1982).
62. Id.
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financing.63 These advantages have not gone unnoticed among
defendants. Concern about "extortionate corporate litigation" surfaced in the 1930s' and is ongoing' in reference to derivative
suits which could extort money in settlement regardless of their
merits. With potential liability often exceeding the net worth of the
defendants, critics note the tendency of corporate managers to seek

insurance against adverse verdicts by settling with the plaintiffs'
attorney.' Even the Supreme Court openly has acknowledged the
leverage plaintiffs' attorneys gain over defendants in group litiga-

tion.'
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exists as one
safeguard against frivolous actions.' However, the concern still

63. Ud
64. See Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REv.
1308, 1308 (1934) ("A 'strike suit' is an action brought by a security holder, not in good
faith, but, through the exploitation of its nuisance value, to force the payment of a sum
disproportionate to the normal value of his interest as the price of discontinuance."). Congress amended § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 in Title II of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 with a provision to deter 'strike' or nuisance suits. See Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); see also Lazos, supra note 20, at 32425 n.94 (describing three forms of strike suits).
65. The Seventh Circuit reiterated this common concern:
Ensuring that the suit stems from real grievances of real persons is especially
important in securities class actions. The costs of litigation are so great, the potential damages so high, and the sources of payment so likely to disappear in
the event of victory after trial, that many cases settle for substantial sums,
which one careful study has found to be unrelated to the strength of the claim.
Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing JANET M. COOPER, Do
THE MERIs MATrTR? A STUDY OF SErnLEMENTS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS (Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 73, 1990)).
66. See Richard H. Underwood, Legal Ethics and Class Actions: Problems, Tactics and
Judicial Responses, 71 KY. L.J. 787, 818 (1982-83) (noting that plaintiffs with frivolous
claims may coerce settlement); see also William C. O'Kelley, Class Actions: Proposals
for New Rules of Professional Responsibility, LrrtG., Winter 1979, at 25, 25 (District
Judge from the Northern District of Georgia alleges: "Too often, boilerplate class allegations are used indiscriminately by lawyers for the purpose of intimidating defendants into
settling with the named plaintiffs in the early stages of the litigation.").
67. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739-40 (noting the "widespread recognition that
litigation under Rule lob-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in
kind from that which accompanies litigation in general . . . . The very pendency of the
lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant which is totally
unrelated to the lawsuit."); see also Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra
note 41, at 670 n.3 (listing cases in which courts have criticized plaintiffs' attorneys). One
study noted that almost 75% of shareholder derivative and class action lawsuits resulted in
some type of settlement, although only 2 of 88 decided by the court resulted in plaintiffs'
victories. See Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REv. 542, 545 (1980).
68. The pertinent text of Rule 11 states:
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exists in situations where plaintiffs' attorneys with private agreements guaranteeing their return (regardless of court allocation of
fees) could be induced to file suits strictly for their settlement
value. Judge Jack B. Weinstein noted the problem in his initial
attorneys' fees opinion in the Agent Orange case.' While recognizing the need to provide incentives to attorneys to undertake
complex and expensive class action litigation, Judge Weinstein observed: "Nevertheless, the potential for abuse of the class action
device exists. Overly generous fee awards may encourage cases
without merit to be brought and pressed beyond reasonable limits,
forcing defendants to settle to avoid burdensome litigation expenses
and adverse publicity."7 Judge Weinstein also noted that Rule 11
sanctions provide small comfort for defendants. "The threshold of
egregiousness required to make out a case under Rule 11 is so
high, and the probability of successful motions for improper certification so low, that the Rule in general provides little protection
for prospective defendants, the public and the courts."7
D. Costs Associated with Financing Class Actions
Regardless of the merits of the claim(s), complex litigation,
especially class actions, can be extremely expensive. Expert witness
fees, exhibits, filing and transcription charges, and discovery expenses are only some of the preliminary costs incurred before
trial. 2 Supreme Court decisions on class notification often mean

SIGNATURE. Every . . . paper . . . shall be signed ....
[the]
(B) REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court ...
paper, an attorney . . . is certifying that to the best of [his or her] knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,(1) it is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law ....
(A)

FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Underwood, supra note 66, at 818 (noting that attorneys
have a professional obligation to determine if sufficient evidentiary support exists for class
action allegations).
69. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(awarding reasonable attorneys' fees), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
70. In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1303.
71. Id. at 1304.
72. Vincent R. Johnson, The Second Circuit Review-1986-87 Term: Ethics: Ethical
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that the initial steps of assembling and notifying the class can be

among the most costly.73 In class actions filed under Rule
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules, the members of the class must re-

ceive "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort."'74 In a large class action, such notice easily can
cost more than half a million dollars.75 In the Agent Orange case,
the attorneys were faced with millions of dollars in costs to communicate with hundreds of thousands of potential plaintiffs in the
United States, New Zealand, and Australia.76

Notice costs and other expenses become particularly significant
in the approximately 15 states which retain the Model Code.' In
those states, attorneys must obtain the client's consent to pay the
costs of losing litigation.78 The Model Rules are somewhat more
flexible in allocating responsibility for litigation expenses.79 In
jurisdictions where they have been adopted, the Model Rules' acceptance of contingent repayment of expenses abolishes what had
been a "critical limitation upon a lawyer's ability to finance litiga-

Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class Actions, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 539,
545 (1988); Cox, supra note 29, at 153 n.2.
73. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974) (requiring individual
notice for all class members who can be identified with reasonable effort). The Supreme
Court later ruled that constitutional due process requires that:
[t]he
plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel ....
Additionally,
we hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing
and returning an "opt out" or "request for exclusion" form to the court.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
74. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2). However, notice is generally not required in a Rule
23(b)(2) class action requesting injunctive or declaratory relief, where defining the class
precisely is not as important. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 31 n.98 (noting that
while notice generally is not required for 23(b)(2) class actions, notice may be mandatory
at the judge's discretion).
75. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 27 & n.84.
76. Johnson, supra note 72, at 548.
77. See STEPHEN GLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 319 (1993).
78. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at DR 5-103 (B) ("[A] lawyer may advance or
guarantee the expenses of litigation . . . provided the client remains ultimately liable for
such expenses.").
79. See MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule 1.8(e) ((1) "[A] lawyer may advance
court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter, and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court
costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.").
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tion."8 Despite its clear implications for the viability of litigation,
the requirement that the client consent to pay costs frequently is
considered a formality: attorneys almost always pay costs without
expecting reimbursement." However, some courts strictly enforce
the rule as written. In one case, the plaintiffs' attorneys told the
class representatives that their firm would not seek reimbursement
of costs if the suit were unsuccessful. 2 The court then denied
class certification on the ground that the agreement was "tantamount to the unacceptable situation of the attorney being a member
of the class of litigants while serving as class counsel."83
With this uncertainty looming, plaintiffs with small recoveries
at stake rarely will agree to pay costs.' One commentator remarked, "[t]he named plaintiff in these suits commonly has such a
small stake in the outcome of litigation that sanity alone prohibits

him from accepting liability for expenses that will almost surely
exceed any gain he might conceivably achieve."85 If he or she did
accept such liability, the incentive to settle might be considered so
strong that he or she could not fairly represent the class. 6 In addition, plaintiffs whose financial standing is sufficient to support
costs may be attacked on that ground as atypical of the class,"
violating one of the four prerequisites to class actions under Rule
23.

80. Findlater, supra note 34, at 1667.
81. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 32 n.101, 71, 85-86; see also Findlater,
supra note 34, at 1669 (explaining that the canon is frequently violated in individual
suits); Mark Lynch, Ethical Rules in Flux: Advancing Costs of Litigation, LrrG., Winter
1981, at 19-21 (asserting that Model Code DR 5-103(B) seriously impedes litigation,
supporting contingent cost agreements, and noting that DR 5-103(B) is "widely ignored").
82. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. 485, 489 (D. Md. 1982).
83. Id. at 490. But see Brame v. Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568 (N.D.N.Y. 1979)
(finding that the fact that a legal aid organization advanced expenses does not establish
inadequate representation); Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1991) (vacating
order denying class certification in securities class action when plaintiff refused to accept
liability for costs of the suit).
84. Rand, 926 F.2d at 599 (asserting that "[o]nly a lunatic would do so"). See also
Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 47, at 897-98 (noting that
clients with small claims will not risk litigation if they remain ultimately liable for litigation costs).
85. Findlater, supra note 34, at 1669-70; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at
19-20, 70 (Even where the aggregate number of claims is large, "the small size of the
individual claims creates enormous free-rider effects: no rational plaintiff would take on
the role of litigation monitor because she would incur all the costs of doing so but would
realize only her pro rata share of the benefits.").
86. Coffee, The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation, supra note 47, at 898.
87. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 87-88.
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Financial issues are a major factor to be weighed by both
plaintiff and attorney in the decision to undertake class litigation.

The American rule on attorney fees places the burden of financing
a lawsuit in most cases on a plaintiff and her attorney, rather than
shifting fees to the losing side."8 The cost of a lawsuit must be
justified by the anticipated recovery, by the class as a whole, if not

by any individual class member.8 9 Concomitantly, a lawsuit which
the parties think worthy of financing is presumed to merit the
attention and resources of the judicial system."o Problems arise
when other factors, such as attorney investment, distort the assessment of the costs of the lawsuit for the parties directly involved.
When the defendants can be pressured to settle by significant risk

exposure, and yet the plaintiffs can expect only small recoveries,
the prime beneficiaries of the large-scale, small claim class action
become the plaintiffs' attorneys.9'
E. Fee Arrangements in Class Actions
Courts in the United States use two main methods of fee calculation. The predominant method is the "lodestar" which was developed in the Third Circuit in the 1970s.' The lodestar method has
been followed by most circuits which have developed standards for
setting fees.93 The court multiplies the reasonable hours devoted to

88. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the American rule).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (explaining that aggregate recovery for a
class encourages multiple parties with small individual claims to seek redress).
90. See supra text accompanying note 54 (observing that without class actions small
individual injuries with large aggregate costs to society would go unredressed).
91. See infra note 238 (stating that the plaintiffs' attorneys are the beneficiaries and
real parties in interest in class actions).
92. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.
(Lindy II), 540 F.2d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 1976); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy 1), 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) (adopting
the "lodestar" approach). The Supreme Court followed the Third Circuit's lead by adopting the "lodestar" approach in civil rights cases in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983).
93. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 244 (1985) (Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force). But see Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) (following the decision in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)). The Johnson method uses
twelve factors with which to assess the fee request:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The
The
The
The
the

time and labor required.
novelty and difficulty of the questions.
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of
case.
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the case by the lawyer's reasonable hourly fee to create an objective "lodestar."' Courts then can use multipliers to adjust the fee

subjectively for various situations, including high-risk litigation."
The main alternative to the lodestar approach is the "percentage
of recovery" method. This was the most commonly used method
until the lodestar approach superseded it in the 1970s, 96 although
it is gaining popularity once again. 97 Under this formula, attorneys
are awarded a fixed or sliding percentage of the plaintiff's recovery.98 Although the fees awarded under either scheme may be approximately equal, 99 and the Supreme Court has approved of each
in different contexts,"u each method has its critics.
Major criticisms of the lodestar approach involve its asserted

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

The customary fee.
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances.
The amount involved and the results obtained.
The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys.
The "undesirability" of the case.
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
Awards in similar cases.

Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. The Supreme Court noted that "many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9; see also In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723
F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("The Lindy and [Johnson] approaches are not
dissimilar. However, the latter method is more cumbersome and includes factors that are
often inapplicable to a particular case.").
94. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989) (applying this method for determining fees); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (same); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888
(1984) (same).
95. See Feinberg & Gomperts, supra note 37, at 617 (explaining that the fairly objective first step of multiplying the number of hours spent on the suit by an hourly fee is
followed by a more subjective step of evaluating the services). This simplistic description
belies what is in fact "an extremely difficult and imprecise process." Id.
96. See Mashburn v. National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 687-88 (M.D. Ala.
1988) (explaining that the percentage method was used between 1885-1973 to calculate
awards. As early as 1885, the Supreme Court accepted the attorney's claim to a portion
of the common fund in Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885).).
97. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 23 n.66.
98. Id. at 4.
99. See Coffee, Understanding the Plainti's Attorney, supra note 41, at 678-79 n.26
(observing that studies show that in suits involving more than $1,000,000, courts generally
award the same amount under either formula). Fees in class and derivative actions are
typically in the range of 20-30% of recovery, with the percentage declining as the total
amount increases. See id. at 685-86.
100. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989) ("[W]e have adopted the lodestar approach as the centerpiece of attorney's fee awards."); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 900 n.16 (1984) ("[U]nder the 'common fund doctrine,' ...
a reasonable fee is
based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class.")
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incentives to pad billable hours,' its burden on the parties"e
and the court, 3 and the fact that its guarantee of fees in successful cases may cause attorneys to reject a favorable settlement for
the class."0 In 1985, the Third Circuit, which had pioneered the
lodestar approach in the Lindy I and Lindy II cases," formed a
Task Force to address the "widespread belief that the deficiencies
of the current system either offset or exceed its benefits."" 6 Specifically, the Third Circuit Task Force "concluded that the lodestar
formula increases the use of judicial resources, encourages attor'
neys to bill excessive hours, and discourages early settlements. '""c
Several commentators have viewed the settlement problem from
a different perspective. In some cases, plaintiffs' attorneys can be
tempted to negotiate early with the defense counsel about settlement. The ensuing pre-litigation work becomes merely a
"meaningless exercise" to bill additional hours after a settlement

101. See generally In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (describing abuses by plaintiffs' counsel), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3rd Cir.
1984).
102. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 246 (1985) (Report of The
Third Circuit Task Force) (increased paperwork required).
103. See id. at 246, 249 (recognizing the administrative problems associated with this
approach including determination of the appropriate fee rate).
104. Id. at 248. The following is an abbreviated list of the major allegations identified,
although not verified, by the Task Force:
(1) Lindy increases the workload of an already overtaxed judicial system.
(2) The elements of the Lindy process are insufficiently objective and produce
results that are far from homogenous.
(3) The Lindy process creates a sense of mathematical precision that is unwarranted in terms of the realities of the practice of law.
(4) Lindy is subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calibrate fees in
terms of percentages of the settlement fund or the amounts recovered by
the plaintiffs or of an overall dollar amount.
(5) Although designed to curb certain abuses, Lindy has led to others. (e.g.,
padding bills, lack of incentive to settle)
(6) Lindy creates a disincentive for the early settlement of cases.
(7) Lindy does not provide the district court with enough flexibility to reward
or deter lawyers so that desirable objectives, such as early settlement, will
be fostered.
(8) The Lindy process works to the particular disadvantage of the public interest bar.
(9) Despite the apparent simplicity of the Lindy formulation, considerable
confusion and lack of predictability remain in its adminstration.
Id. at
105.
106.
107.

246-49.
See cases cited supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 246.
Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 675 n.17.
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has been agreed upon in actuality." 8 In this way, the lodestar approach can produce structural, de facto collusion between the
plaintiffs attorney and defendants."° In this scenario, the defendant makes a low settlement offer and then cooperates with the
plaintiff's attorney to allow the latter to accumulate hours, which
are deducted from the class recovery at no additional cost to the
defendant."0 "At no point must either side actually link the fee
award and the settlement size in their negotiations-the law does
this for them by tying fee awards to hours billed rather than settlement size.'
The lodestar approach, therefore, can award a settling attorney the same fee award she would receive if she litigated
a much higher recovery for the plaintiffs at trial.' Under this
analysis, the lodestar approach is "too vulnerable to collusive settlements.""..3 "In effect, under the lodestar formula, a plaintiffs attorney shares his clients' downside risk, but not their upside gain,
by rejecting a settlement and proceeding to trial.""' 4 Without a
premium to compensate for the risk an attorney takes in advancing
funds, he or she has nothing to gain by rejecting a settlement
which includes repayment of expenses." 5 When the settlement
figure soars into the millions of dollars, the incentive to settle
increases, regardless of the fact that recovery after trial could be
6
even greater."1
Advocates of the percentage-of-recovery method note that in
most cases it is easier to compute," 7 and increases the amount of
108. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 23, 45.
109. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 718.
110. Id.
111. Id. Professor Rosenberg disputes Coffee's analysis by pointing to court-sanctioned
fee multipliers available to accommodate risk, success, and benefit factors. See David
Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means,
62 IND. L.J. 561, 584 n.89 (1987) (contending that elements of bureaucratic justice present in class actions accomplish the goals of tort litigation more effectively than traditional
individual litigation). But see infra note 288 and accompanying text (noting recent Supreme Court decisions which restrict fee multipliers).
112. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 717; see also
Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972) ("A relatively small settlement may
well produce [a fee] bearing a higher ratio to the cost of the work than a much larger
recovery obtained only after extensive discovery, a long trial and an appeal.").
113. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 689 n.57.
114. Id. at 717-18.
115. See Findlater, supra note 34, at 1674 (noting that in the absence of a risk premium the attorney may accept a settlement in the amount of advanced expenses rather
than risk no recovery by proceeding to trial).
116. Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 58 (1975).
117. See supra note 95 (noting difficulties of lodestar calculations). But see In re Supe-
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certainty with which plaintiffs' counsel can calculate potential fee
awards."' Less risk may result in more litigation, which some
regard as "additional private enforcement of the law.... The percentage-of-recovery method has been termed a "deregulatory" approach which is "the only alternative to converting the courts into
the equivalent of public utility commissions."'" Nonetheless, at
least one court has said that there is "no necessary logical connection" between the percentage system and reasonable compensation
for attorneys.'' Attorneys can feel pressure to settle at the point
when their percentage recovery is at its highest hourly rate, i.e.
when they have expended enough hours to obtain settlement but
not necessarily as many as a maximum settlement or trial victory
would require." Thus, percentage fees can result in windfall
profits for the class attorneys when their expenses are low relative
to the proposed settlement." Additionally, this method has a decreased deterrent effect on defendant's conduct: attorneys will not

rior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 124 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting difficulty in establishing percentages of certain types of awards: "[W]hat is the present
cash value of a class recovery that provides for certificates, redeemable over time, in an
undetermined amount to range from 49 to 70 million?").
118. As noted above, the question of what percentage is appropriate is open to debate.
See, e.g., In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (30 percent); Mashburn v. National Healthcare Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 692 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (50
percent generally considered upper limit, with exceptions); Greene v. Emersons Ltd., No.
76 Civ. 2178, 1987 WL 11558, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (award of 46.2% of fund "reaches
the outer limits"); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 750
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (under 25 percent), affd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Macey &
Miller, supra note 33, at 59.
119. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 59. Alternatively, such a prospect could be
viewed with alarm by prospective defendants. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying
text (discussing the possibility that defendants may be forced into extortionate settlements
irrespective of a suit's merits).
120. Coffee, Understanding the PlaintfiOs Attorney, supra note 41, at 725. The Third
Circuit Task Force insisted, however, that "[f]irm judicial control" was needed to prevent
its recommended
negotiated percentage approach from becoming "protracted,
hypertechnical, and a battlefield for the participants." Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108
F.R.D. 237, 258 (1985) (Report of the Third Circuit Task Force).
121. Superior Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 125 ("The point is that 'percentage' is a relational concept. Percentage of what? Fifty percent is neither a lot nor a little, until one knows
what the underlying whole is. Half of one cookie isn't much. Half of a full cookie jar
may well be a lot.").
122. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 25, 44; see also Superior Beverage,. 133 F.R.D.
at 124 (describing a contingent fee "sell-out" settlement); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131
F.R.D. 688, 694 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same); Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 687 n.55 (crediting Professors Schwartz and Mitchell with identifying the link between the percentage formula and incentives for premature settlements).
123. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 23.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:291

accept cases where the attorney's fee award will not exceed his or
her costs, even if the plaintiff still would receive a substantial
recovery."
One proposal for resolving the seemingly intractable problems
in fee awards in class actions is an auction theory." Under this
theory, the right to bring a claim and keep any recovery would be
auctioned off, with the winning bidder free to prosecute the claim
without the burden of class action prerequisites and the necessity of
court supervision."' Modified auction theory would have attorneys competing for the lead counsel rights in a bidding process
based on their proposed percentage of recovery. 27 Auction theory,
of course, has its own problems, including defining the claim to be
sold, investigating the financial status of bidders, negotiating with
the claim owners, and resolving jurisdictional problems in consoli-

dation.'

More significantly, auction theory forces us to confront

directly the question of who is the real party in interest. 29 The
ethical issues raised by auction theory are beyond the scope of this
Note, but the concept raises many of the same questions of professional ethics, economy, and efficiency.

124. Id. at 60-61.
125. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 692-93 (discussing variations in the auction theory). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Auctioning Class & Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 458 (1993)
(responding to Thomas & Hansen, infra); Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 6 (proposing
an auction theory); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and
Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 423 (1993) (evaluating and
recommending experimentation with judicial auctions); Rosenberg, supra note 104, at 584
n.89 (suggesting investigation of auctions and outright purchases of claims by attorneys).
126. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 109 (discussing the advantages of auction
theory).
127. See id. at 6, 106-16 (providing a basic overview of the auction theory process);
see also In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (describing the
bidding procedure); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 548 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(awarding lead counsel rights to successful bidder); In re Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig., 753
F. Supp. 716, 721 n.12 (N.D. I11. 1990) (approving approach of Oracle Securities).
128. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 7.
129. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest."). In the context of an auction, Macey and Miller see no reason to
reveal to the jury that a claim has been bought by, for example, a corporation: "a considerably less appealing plaintiff than thousands of innocent small individuals." Macey &
Miller, supra note 33, at 116. But see Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 353 & n.13 (1980) (Powell, J. dissenting) (rejecting "client-less"
litigation in general and questioning whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the
federal courts for cases which "will be litigated by lawyers whose only 'clients' are unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.").
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The Agent Orange PMC Fee Agreement

The private agreements concerning fees and expenses reached
by the attorneys in the Agent Orange case were the result of tortuous attempts to finance adequately the massive, complicated litigation. In 1979, Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., a workmen's compensation
lawyer, amended a complaint filed by Edward J. Gorman in 1978,
which grew into the class action now referred to as the Agent
Orange case. 3 ' Yannacone established a consortium known as
Yannacone and Associates, consisting of attorneys from small Long
Island, New York personal injury firms.' The consortium quickly encountered internal dissent and escalating costs, spending over
$500,000 in the initial stages of preparing the case.132 As a result
of these difficulties, the consortium withdrew as class counsel in
September 1983 and was replaced by a three-member Plaintiffs'
Management Committee (PMC)."'
When Judge Jack Weinstein took over the case from Judge
George C. Pratt in 1983, he threw the plaintiffs' camp into a
"near-panic" by setting a trial date which gave the parties less than
seven months to complete pretrial investigation and preparation of
the case."3 Overwhelmed, the plaintiffs' attorneys sought help.
Nine of the original attorneys eventually agreed to continue their

work on the case under a reconstituted leadership group. 35 In December, 1983, nine members of a new Plaintiffs' Management
Committee'36 executed an agreement requiring six members to

130. ScHuIcK, supra note 1, at 42, 45.
131. Id. at 51. The members of the consortium were Victor Yannacone, Hy Herman,
Albert J. Fiorella, Eugene O'Brien, William F. Levine, David J. Dean, Edward F. Hayes
III, Edward J. Gorman, Milton Mokotoff, Jim Kelly, Irving Like, and Donald Russo. See
generally i (listing the attorneys' names informally).
132. Id. at 107-08.
133. The new PMC consisted of Stephen J. Schlegel, Benton Musslewhite, and Thomas
W. Henderson. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1454
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
134. See SCHtUCK, supra note 1, at 110-11, 119-20. On October 21, 1983, Judge
Weinstein established a firm trial date of May 7, 1984. Id. at 11-13. Until that point, the
case had been in process for almost five years, in "a rather placid, predictable pattern
largely dominated by the minutiae of discovery, a routine undisturbed by any prospect of
imminent trial." Id. at 111.
135. Id. at 109.
136. The nine were David . Dean, Stephen J. Schlegel, Benton Musslewhite, Newton
B. Schwartz, John O'Quinn, Phillip E. Brown, Gene Locks, Stanley Chesley, and Thomas
Henderson. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 216, 221 (2d
Cir.) (listing names and fee awards), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
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advance $200,000 each for litigation expenses.'37 These investorattorneys were to receive $600,000 from the award of attorney's
fees if the case were successful. Of the remaining fees, 50 percent
were to be divided equally among the nine members, 30 percent
would be divided according to the hours each member devoted to
the case, and 20 percent would be divided by a majority vote on
the basis of certain quality and risk factors. 3
When Judge Weinstein learned of this agreement four months
after settlement, 39 he expressed "serious doubt about [its] legality
and propriety."'" The PMC members then executed a new agreement in December, 1984, which was retroactive to October 1,
1983.14t The new agreement left the percentage of return on investment unchanged at 300%, but increased the maximum allowable contribution of five of the six investors to a total of $250,000
each.'42 The percentage return on investment feature of the agreement was applied to the three non-investor attorneys "43 on the
committee, allowing them to contribute up to the limit of $50,000
each and receive the same threefold return as the others. 44 The
new agreement eliminated the previous provisions for dividing fees
remaining after the expenses and multiplier were deducted, and
substituted division among all PMC members "in the proportion
the individual's and/or firm's fee award bears to the total fees
awarded."' 45 The district court awarded over $4.7 million in fees
to the nine PMC members1" out of the total
of $7.9 million in
47
fees and $1.4 million in expenses awarded.
The internal PMC agreement radically altered the district
court's individual award to each attorney. 4 The six investor-at137. Id. at 218.
138. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987). Additional expenses above the amounts contributed were to be reimbursed without a multiplier. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id; see also SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 202-03.
141. In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1454.
142. Brown, Chesley, Locks, O'Quinn, and Schwartz increased their contributions. Id.
Henderson remained at $200,000. Id. at 1454-55.
143. David Dean, Steven Schlegel, and Benton Musslewhite. Id. As it turned out, these
members did not advance money for general expenses, and were reimbursed separately for
individual expenses incurred. Id. at 1455.
144. Id. at 1454.
145. Id.
146. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 926 (1987).
147. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 200.
148. See In re "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 219-20 & n.2 (illustrating this change with
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torneys were awarded a total of $2,000,244 by the district
court.'49 The three noninvestors were awarded $2,713,388,'" or
slightly less than 58 percent of the fees awarded to the PMC. After
the agreement was applied, the noninvestors' share dropped to
$1,142,613, with the investors' share increasing to $3,621,164.'

The difference for individual members was striking: David Dean,
the chief litigator for the PMC, was compensated at the rate of ap-

proximately $55.62 per hour, while Newton Schwartz, "essentially
a passive investor," collected more than $1700 per hour.'

III. ANALYsIs
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the honor and
integrity of his profession... to conduct himself as to
reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the
confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the
public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILry
EThIcAL CONSIDERATION
9-6

A.

Potential Conflicts Created by Attorney Investment

In general, rules of legal ethics value client autonomy 53 and

a chart of the fees awarded to each attorney by the district court and the amount received
after application of the PMC agreement, showing decreased fees for the three litigating attorneys and increased fees for the six investing attorneys); see also Johnson, supra note
72, at 550 n.37 (describing the PMC fee-sharing agreement).
149. See In re "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 220 n.2 (listing the fees awarded to
Schwartz, O'Quinn, Brown, Locks, Chesley and Henderson).
150. See id. (listing the fees awarded to Dean, Schlegel, and Musslewhite).
151. Id. The chart here contains an unexplained difference in the total fees awarded by
the district court ($4,713,632) and under the PMC agreement ($4,763,777).
152. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 203.
153. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at EC 7-7:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make
decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such
decisions are binding on his lawyer. As [a] typical example[] in civil cases, it
is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer ....
See also MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule 1.2(a): "A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult with
the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." In order to facili-
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the right of the client to supervise his or her attorney."5 "A fundamental premise of American adjudicative structures is that clients, not their counsel, define litigation objectives."'55 These
guidelines, at least facially, apply equally to large-scale litigation. 56 However, some commentators note that code provisions
on client autonomy and attorney responsibilities were designed with
ordinary litigation in mind."7 "[B]y presupposing an individual
client with clearly identifiable views, [ethical] codes elide a fre-

tate the accomplishment of the client's objectives, the attorney must keep the client reasonably well informed. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at EC 7-8 ("A lawyer should
exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client
has been informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer ought to initiate this decisionmaking process if the client does not do so."); id. at EC 9-2 ("In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform
his client of material developments in the matters being handled for the client."); MODEL
RULES, supra note 30, at Rule 1.4 ("(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
154. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 677 (noting
the traditional view that the client and not the attorney should define the objections of the
litigation).
155. Rhode, supra note 61, at 1183; see also Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.
(Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that the lawyer may make tactical choices while deferring to the client on "major litigation decisions"), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
156. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at DR 5-106 (A):
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not make or participate in
the making of an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against his clients,
unless each client has consented to the settlement after being advised of the
existence and nature of all the claims involved in the proposed settlement, of
the total amount of the settlement, and of the participation of each person in
the settlement.
See also MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule 1.4 cmt. 1 ("Even when a client delegates authority to the lawyer, the client should be kept advised of the status of the matter."); id. at Rule 2.2 cmt. 6 ("In a common representation, the lawyer is still required . . . to keep each client adequately informed ....
"); id. at Rule 1.8(g):
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each
client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person
in the settlement.
157. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 540 (noting that the attorney-client relationship was
envisioned as a "simple, elegant paradigm"); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in
Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 481 (1994) ("Our current general code of
ethics assumes a Lincolnesque lawyer strongly bonded to an individual client.").
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15
quent and fundamental difficulty in class action proceedings, 8

in essence, the tenuous control of attorneys by their clients in the
class. One court noted that "no clear allocation of decisionmaking

responsibility has emerged between the attorney and class members."' 59 Unlike most plaintiffs, members of the class are bound

by the results of litigation they do not control."6 Clients in ordinary litigation are entitled to fire their-attorneys at will.'

In the

class action context, however, the class must seek the approval of
the court to dismiss its attorney. 62 Difficulties in gaining access
to information and exercising its collective will make the class
more dependent than ordinary plaintiffs upon its attorney and less
able to exercise the prerogatives of the average client.
Unfortunately, no one in the plaintiff class has any active interest in pursuing disciplinary action against a lawyer who violates
ethical rules. Even a representative plaintiff may have so little at
stake that bringing a disciplinary action would be pointless. 63
Judges lack plaintiffs' personal stake in ethical representation, and

defense attorneys actually may benefit by ethical lapses of the
plaintiffs' counsel."6
As a practical matter, then, the deterrent function of "private
attorneys general ' ' "as has led to a marginalized role for both the
representative plaintiff and the class itself. "[A]lthough our law
publicly expresses homage to individual clients, it privately recognizes their limited relevance in this context."'" Class members
have few options for receiving information and making informed
decisions about the litigation, given the enormous costs of commu-

158. Rhode, supra note 61, at 1183.
159. In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163 (1984) (Adams, J. concurring), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
160. Lazos, supra note 20, at 308 n.3.
161. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at DR 2-110(B)(4) ("A lawyer representing a client . . . shall withdraw from employment[ ] if .... [hie is discharged by his client.");
MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule 1.16(3) ("[A] lawyer shall . . . withdraw from the
representation of a client if . . . the lawyer is discharged."); id. at Rule 1.16 cmt. 4 ("A
client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to
liability for payment for the lawyer's services.").
162. Lazos, supra note 20, at 318 & n.58. Under the Model Rules, discharge of an appointed attorney may be subject to applicable law. MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule
1.16 cmt. 5.
163. See generally supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (providing an overview of how
class actions encourage small claims to be brought by solving the "free rider" problem).
164. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 21.
165. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 669 n.l.
166. Id. at 678-79.
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nicating with the class.'67 Decisions requiring more than a "yes"
or "no" answer would require unworkably cumbersome procedures.' 68 In addition, large-scale communications could compromise confidentiality required for successful settlement strategy.' 9

In sum, "[t]he profession's customary mechanism for coping with
counsel's self-interest--disclosure and informed client consent-is
simply not a workable approach in class adjudication."' 7

Class actions, thus, create a unique attorney-client relationship.
"[C]lass and derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk and
exercise nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the
lawsuit.'' Concomitantly with this high degree of control, the
plaintiffs' attorney has a fiduciary relationship with both the named
representative and the absent class members.' One court explicitly stated: "[Buy granting class status, the court places the attorney

for the named parties in a position of public trust and responsibility, and in effect creates an attorney-client
relationship between the
' 73
absentee members and the attorney.'
In discounting the entrepreneurial attorney's fiduciary role,
Professor John C. Coffee rejects what he labels "the 'noble myth':
namely that the client can and should control all litigation decisions."'7 More succinctly, Coffee asserts that "[e]ven the most
practical litigator or judge is often the slave of some defunct law

167. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356 (1978) (stating that
plaintiffs are responsible for the costs of identifying class members in most situations);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (holding that plaintiff must bear
the cost of providing notice by mail to approximately six million class members); Rhode,
supra note 61, at 1214 (discussing the lack of feasibility of obtaining informed consent
from all class members).
168. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 20.
169. See Weinstein, supra note 157, at 511 ("Secrecy often has been, in fact, the price
of settlement."); Lazos, supra note 20, at 317 (explaining that communication to the class
might weaken the class's position if confidentiality is important to success).
170. Rhode, supra note 61, at 1212.
171. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 3; see also Dam, supra note 116, at 60 ("The
attorney is an entrepreneur.").
172. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1176
(5th Cir. 1978) (stating that the plaintiffs' counsel must turn to the court for assistance in
cases of conflict between named representatives and the class), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1115 (1979); see also Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973)
(asserting that both plaintiff's attorney and the court have fiduciary obligations); Rhode,
supra note 61, at 1203 ("[C]ounsel's fiduciary obligations run to the class as a whole.").
173. Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 560 (E.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1977).
174. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 47, at 877.
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professor who taught him to think of the lawyer as a fiduciary." Coffee acknowledges that the entrepreneurial model of the
plaintiffs' attorney "may seem offensive to those accustomed to
viewing the relationship as a fiduciary one."176 The more common
view relies on the fiduciary role of the class attorney when faced

with a situation in which "the litigation directives of nominal plaintiffs are not of controlling significance."1" Without this fiduciary

overlay, it is hard to justify giving attorneys the wide latitude they
currently enjoy in representing the interests of absentee class members.
B. Actual Conflicts Created by Attorney Investment
in the Agent Orange Example
Fee agreements which guarantee specific returns on investment

from either settlement or judgment automatically produce at least
the potential for conflicts between the attorney and the class. Both
the district court and the appellate court in Agent Orange recognized that the PMC agreement represented a potential conflict of

interest for the investor-attorneys. 78 The Fifth Circuit had previously phrased the issue in broad terms: "[Wihenever an attorney is
confronted with a potential for choosing between actions which
may benefit himself financially and an action which may benefit
the class which he represents there is a reasonable possibility that
some specifically identifiable impropriety will occur." '79 Chief

Justice Burger concurred in a 1980 opinion, in which he noted the
"obvious" potential for abuse in the class action format, where the

175. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 726-27; see also
Lazos, supra note 20, at 314 n.35 (noting the distinction between the entrepreneurial and
fiduciary models in literature on the class action plaintiff's attorney).
176. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintifs Attorney, supra note 41, at 683.
177. Rhode, supra note 61, at 1203. Professor Coffee's analysis of attorney as entrepreneur largely ignores the other individual and social motivations for litigation, such as
the vindication of a controversial and perhaps painful position or simply the desire experienced by the Agent Orange veterans for their "day in court."
For many . . . the central purpose of the Agent Orange case . . . had always
been to publicize, palliate, and in some sense justify the veterans' sufferings by
allowing them to tell their story, find an authoritative explanation for their
conditions, and assign moral and legal responsibility. Compared to this goal, the
prospect of monetary compensation, although important, was for these veterans
decidedly subsidiary.
ScHucK, supra note 1, at 171. Judge Weinstein later acknowledged the importance of the
Agent Orange veterans' non-monetary goals. Weinstein, supra note 157, at 503.
178. Johnson, supra note 72, at 562.
179. Zylestra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
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class members have only a nominal stake and others are the main
beneficiaries. 8 ' In Agent Orange, the Second Circuit zeroed in:
Given the size and complexity of the litigation, it seems
apparent that the potential for abuse was real and should
have been discouraged .... The conflict obviously lies in
the incentive provided to an investor-attorney to settle early
and thereby avoid work for which full payment may not be
authorized by the district court. Moreover, as soon as an
offer of settlement to cover the promised return on investment is made, the investor-attorney will be disinclined to
undertake the risks associated with continuing the litigation.
The conflict was especially egregious here, since six of the
nine PMC members were investing parties to the
agreement.' 8
The district court and the court of appeals viewed the predicament of the plaintiffs' attorneys quite differently." The assumptions each court made about the necessity of alternative financing
may well have determined its perspectives on the PMC agreement.'83 Judge Weinstein noted "the great difficulty of funding
such a massive litigation" which confronted Yannacone and Associates (the initial consortium) in the summer of 1983." The court
of appeals was unpersuaded: "[W]hether this class action would
have collapsed without an agreement calling for a threefold return
is a matter of speculation. Any such collapse, however, would have
been due to the pervasive weaknesses in the plaintiffs' case.""
Aside from attorney-class conflicts, fee agreements which substantially alter court-awarded fees generate conflicts among the

180. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
181. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 926 (1987).
182. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 564 (explaining that the district court and court of
appeals judges assessed the importance of creating financing for class action suits differently).
183. Id.
184. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part. 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926
(1987).
185. In re "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 225-26; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437 (2d Cir. 1993) (summarizing weaknesses in the
plaintiffs' case, the later Second Circuit panel noted the following flaws: the military
contractor defense, lack of epidemiological evidence of general causation, difficulty of
proving individual exposure to Agent Orange, problem of proving individual causation).
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litigating and investing attorneys. In Agent Orange, "[tihe effect of

the treble repayment of expenses agreement was to significantly
skew the compensation of individual members of the PMC. ' 'ta
The investors received a greater return from the litigation than they
would have in the commercial markets."' In contrast, the litigators, who had spent years on the case, received a comparatively
poor fee award."'
C.

Resolution of the Conflicts of Interest

in the Agent Orange Case
The district court approved the PMC fee agreement but established structural protections to avoid the negative consequences of
such perceived conflicts of interest in the future. The court required
disclosure of any fee agreement, so that the court and class representatives might have better opportunity to monitor the representation by counsel, saying, "(a) 'sunshine' rule is essential to protect
the interests-of the public, the class and the honor of the legal
profession." '89 Evidently, Judge Weinstein was not pleased to
learn of the PMC agreement four months after the settlement."9

He recognized that court approval of the settlement would not nec-

186. Johnson, supra note 72, at 550.
187. In his earlier opinion, Judge Weinstein evaluated the reasonableness of this rate of
return against conventional investment opportunities available at the time of the agreement
in December 1983.
Interest rates for conventional investments were then high. The length of time
that the Agent Orange case would take to litigate and its outcome both were
uncertain. The investing attorneys could have reasonably expected to receive a
signficant return on their capital through reasonably safe alternative investments-perhaps 50 to 100 percent-over the same time period that their money
was to be invested in the Agent Orange litigation. Thus at the time that the
attorneys committed themselves to making these advances, the expected extra
"profit" was significantly less than the agreed upon total interest of 200 percent, being perhaps 100 to 150 percent above the interest they otherwise probably could have earned in less risky enterprises.
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd,
818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987); see also Johnson, supra note
72, at 550 (discussing treble repayment received by investors). But see infra text accompanying note 245 (noting Second Circuit's observation that "a threefold return on one's
money is a rather generous return in any market over a short period of time").
188. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 550 (noting that those who invested time and effort, rather than money, received less compensation); supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (discussing the discrepancies in fee awards between investors and litigators).
189. In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1454.
190. See SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 203 (stating that Judge Weinstein was troubled by
the agreement).
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essarily "completely eliminate the more subtle effects of undue
pressure on attorneys toward settlement.'. 9 Despite his own ignorance of the PMC agreement during the litigation and settlement
negotiations, Weinstein maintained that his direct observations of
the counsel revealed no reason to believe the fee agreement had
any "appreciable untoward effect" on the settlement decision. 1"2 In
this case, he felt that settlement incentives were balanced by the
incentive to build up hours under the lodestar formula. 9 He also
pointed out that three of the six investors spent a significant
amount of time on the case."9
In any event, Weinstein reasoned that the fee-sharing agreement
did not increase the amount awarded to the attorneys out of the
fund. Rather, it merely redistributed the fee award, so that "[t]he
profit will be paid by those members of the PMC who did the
work."' 95 In refusing to revise the award to reflect his own assessment of proper fees,"9 he noted that "[blusiness realities of
law practice often require that those who bring clients and capital
to a law firm be better compensated than those whose talents lie in
the area of preparing legal papers and arguments."" Another
commentator aptly summarized the situation: "The otherwise grotesque imbalance revealed by Dean's comparisons reflected the
relative value that their money and his services had for the survival
of the case at that point ... ."" Weinstein, although "clearly
troubled" by the agreement,' decided to approve it.
191. 611 F. Supp. at 1461.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 157, at 526 (arguing that the fee-sharing agreement did not reduce the clients' benefits).
196. This in spite of his own feeling that "[t]he plaintiffs' attorneys had done little to
establish their case and would have lost if traditional tort rules had been applied."
Weinstein, supra note 157, at 535. Primarily Weinstein felt that the plaintiffs could not
prove general causation. Id. at 550-51.
197. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1458 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
198. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 204. Another commentator, an Associate Reporter of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, pointedly disparaged Judge Weinstein's approval of the "bizarre" financing agreement in Agent Orange. Linda S. Mullenix, Mass
Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 588 n.31
(1994).
199. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 203; see also In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at
1462 (noting that the failure of the PMC to reveal the existence of the agreement until
late in the litigation was particularly troubling). On the compensation of non-PMC attorneys, Judge Weinstein later wrote:
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On appeal, the Second Circuit confronted the issue directly and
rejected the district judge's assessment of the conflict of interest.
The court acknowledged that attorneys may be more competent
than the court to divide fees equitably among themselves.' However, it asserted that the court's role as guardian of the class under
Rule 23(e) prevented it from allowing attorneys complete discretion
to divide fees among themselves.2"' While the Second Circuit recognized the general practice of permitting discretionary private fee
divisions among attorneys, it noted that none of the authorities
involved cases of investment-based returns.' The court did not
require strict adherence to the lodestar formula, but insisted that
"the distribution of fees must bear some relationship to the services
rendered."'2 3 "The test to be applied is whether, at the time a fee
sharing agreement is reached, class counsel are placed in a position
that might endanger the fair representation of their clients and
whether they will be compensated on some basis other than for
legal services performed."'
The Second Circuit also evaluated the implicit settlement pressures differently than did the lower court. Judge Weinstein discounted any special settlement pressure. He felt such pressures
were inherent in any financing arrangement.2 5 The appellate court
asserted that the incentive created by the lodestar analysis to build
up hours does not fully counteract settlement pressure, because the
judge has the often-exercised power to refuse compensation for
hours spent in various tasks.' The court concluded that the risk

I believe I gave too little attention to this subject in "Agent Orange" and did
not fairly compensate the attorneys who represented individuals. All the fees
went to members of the central committee who had almost no individual client
contact. Many attorneys had spent time with individual clients and should have
received compensation for this important personal relationship aspect of the
litigation.
Weinstein, supra note 157, at 531.
200. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 926 (1987).

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. d
204. Id. at 224.
205. See Weinstein, supra note 157, at 526 (stating that the incentive to settle prematurely in order to recoup profits early exists with any type of financing).
206. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 926 (1987); see, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1296, 1320 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("No time was allowed for nonsubstantive meetings at which
[management] committee members aired their disputes with one another and haggled over
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of inappropriate settlement alone was sufficient grounds to reject
the agreement "as being inconsistent with the interests of the
class."207
The Second Circuit also differed with Judge Weinstein on the
ability of the court to adequately supervise counsel's fee agreement.
When confronted with a settlement agreement, "[t]he court's attention properly is directed toward the overall reasonableness of the
offer and not necessarily to whether class counsel have placed
themselves in a potentially conflicting position with the class.""as
Finally, the appellate court injected a new consideration in asserting
that public perceptions about the interests of class counsel are
appropriate subjects of concern for the court on review.' 9 The
court noted the perception among class members and the general
public that the Agent Orange settlement was inadequate and argued
that such public perception provided additional justification for
voiding an agreement which gave one investor twelve times more
than he was awarded by the district court. 1' The Second Circuit
reversed Judge Weinstein and reinstated the fees as he had apportioned them originally among the PMC members.2 '
D. Analysis of the Conflict of Interest Question
Even assuming the good intentions of the lawyers involved in
Agent Orange, the practice of allowing attorneys to finance a class
action on the basis of an agreement guaranteeing a specific investment return creates an unacceptable level of conflict between the
interests of attorney and class. A guaranteed investment return differs from a flat retainer fee both in the inability of the class to
negotiate for services and supervise their attorneys' activities on
their behalf, as well as in the inadequacy of the court as a substitute watchdog. In a class situation, breaking the link between results and compensation jeopardizes the interests of the class beyond
finances."), affid in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
926 (1987); see also In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D.
119, 126 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Class litigation is risky, and a lawyer as a rational maximizer
will not compound his or her risks by logging long hours that might wind up unrewarded.").
207. In re "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 224.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 225.
210. Id. The court presumably was referring to Newton Schwartz, who was awarded
$41,886 by the district court and received $513,026 under the PMC agreement. Id. at 220
n.2.
211. Id. at 226.
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any benefits gained from additional financing.

1. Monitoring of the Class Attorney by
Class Members and Representatives
The prerogative of the court to appoint lead counsel leaves

class action clients in a position of powerlessness." 2 Lack of
meaningful participation undermines client satisfaction even when
the clients view the outcome as favorable, unlike that in Agent Orange.213 Michael Ryan, one of the representative plaintiffs in the
Agent Orange case, expressed his frustration in his bitter reaction
to the news of settlement: "'The next thing I know, a reporter calls
me at 7 a.m. Monday morning and tells me the case has been
settled. We had no214say in the settlement. Is it a lawyers' case or
the clients' case?"'

The representative plaintiff, chosen by the attorney, perhaps
from his or her retinue of "professional plaintiffs, 2 5 may have
the best opportunity but little incentive to act as a serious auditor.2t6 Despite the fact that named representatives, unlike indigent
defendants, are nominally expected to shoulder litigation costs, they
are often not much more than a "ticket of admission ' 21 7 to the

212. This feeling of powerlessness is analogous to the attitude of criminal defendants
represented by public defenders. Indigent defendants often view their state-paid, court-appointed attorneys with suspicion, which is exacerbated if defendants feel they have no
control over their cases. "[I]n games between attorneys and clients, clients perceive fairness if they trust their attorneys and believe they have a say or voice in the handling of
their cases." Roy B. Flemming, Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their
Relations with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B. FOuND. RFS. J. 253, 268.
213. See Weinstein, supra note 157, at 497 & nn.115-16, 498 & n.120 (noting perceived importance to litigants of procedural fairness).
214. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 169.
215. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 74 (using the derogatory term "professional
plaintiff' to describe someone who serves as a representative plaintiff in multiple class or
shareholder derivative actions); see also Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney,
the securities and derivative suit areas, there are
supra note 41, at 682 (noting that "[i]n
well-known individuals who possess broad (but thin) securities portfolios and have served
as the lead plaintiff in numerous previous class actions").
216. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 682 & n.38
(describing the "near legendary" Harry Lewis, a prolific plaintiff); Rhode, supra note 61,
at 1203 ("[A]s a practical matter, once a class is certified, named plaintiffs generally are
neither highly motivated nor well situated to monitor the congruence between counsel's
conduct and class preferences.").
217. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 683 ("When the
client is neither a potentially valuable witness nor a co-investor in the action, his role
may often be only that of a 'ticket of admission' by which the plaintiff's attorney can
join the caucus of attorneys who gather to organize a class action."); see also Saylor v.
Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that courts should not "accept the
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class action. Legitimate named representatives, such as Michael
Ryan, often lack the knowledge necessary to supervise their attorneys effectively."' The costs of supervision are not normally balanced for the named representative by any bonus for the effort involved." 9 Even a committed plaintiff may accede to settlement
because he or she has little to gain from the additional personal
burdens of litigating to trial."2 There are some situations in
which class members may have the incentive and/or opportunity to
exercise greater control over their attorneys. The structural controls
of the "public interest" firm may be potentially effective restraints
on "attorney opportunism."2"' Also, significant financial harm to
individual class members and/or "a subjective, nonmonetary component to the injury"' can produce closer monitoring.
The representative plaintiff who actively does monitor the class
attorney may encounter difficulty. The attorney usually can overrule
objections by the representative plaintiff by arguing that the attorney is obligated to use his or her judgment on behalf of the whole
class. 2" Courts have allowed attorneys to settle actions against

view that the attorney for the plaintiff is the dominus litis and the plaintiff only a key to
the courthouse door dispensable once entry has been effected").
218. See Lazos, supra note 20, at 318 (stating that plaintiffs often lack the knowledge,
interest, and ability to effectively supervise their attorneys).
219. See Dam, supra note 116, at 58 (stating that economic incentives for plaintiffs discourage close supervision of class attorneys); Lazos, supra note 20, at 319. But see In re
Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 357-58 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (granting
"incentive attorney fee awards" of $2,500 to each class representative who produced documents, and $5,000 to each representative who also was deposed); Enterprise Energy Corp.
v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (approving incentive awards of $50,000 earned by class members); In re SmithKline Beckman Corp. Sec.
Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (granting representative of each plaintiff class in
a securities fraud class action a special award of $5,000 for his/her "public service"); In
re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Serv. Customer Litig., 130 F.R.D. 366 (S.D. Ohio 1990)
(granting plaintiffs' representatives incentive awards ranging from $35,000-$55,000).
220. See Rhode, supra note 61, at 1203 ("Why should named representatives make special efforts to expose conflict that could result in delay, expense, or impairment of their
own litigation objectives?"); Lazos, supra note 20, at 316 ("The risk-averse nature of class
representatives may therefore induce them to settle when the class members would prefer
to present their claims to a neutral party for decision."); see also Josef D. Cooper &
Tracy Kirkham, Class Action Conflicts, LrrlG., Winter 1981, at 35 ("It is a grave mistake
for the lawyer to minimize the personal commitment required of the class plaintiff.").
221. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 680. Conducting a
class action lawsuit on ideological as opposed to economic grounds, however, carries with
it the potential for other types of conflict, for example, regarding appropriate remedies.
222. Id.
223. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway V), 576 F.2d 1157, 1176
(5th Cir. 1978) (stating that, in conflicts between named representatives and the class,
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the wishes of the class representatives on that basis.'
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Absentee

members of the class, of course, have virtually no opportunity to
monitor the class attorney. Class action clients are not physically

present to review their attorneys' work and many lack the legal
expertise to evaluate it effectively.'

Quality control options open

to normal plaintiffs, e.g., investigating an attorney's reputation before hiring her and requesting second opinions, are unavailable as a
practical matter to class action plaintiffs. 6 The normal constraints
which ordinarily apply when an attorney is concerned about his or

her reputation are not necessarily applicable to the class action
context. There, as noted above, the attorney chooses the plaintiffs,
rather than vice versa.' Plaintiffs' attorneys often are more con-

plaintiffs' attorneys should notify court so that it can protect the absentee class members),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 115 (1979); Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 20 (noting that the
attorney represents the class as a whole and need not follow the directions of any individual class member); Rhode, supra note 61, at 1203 & n.82 (arguing that, because the
attorney's obligation is to the entire class, objections of nominal plaintiffs are not disposi-

tive).
224. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintij's Attorney, supra note 41, at 677-78 (discussing plaintiffs' attorneys' and their clients' relative degrees of control in the context of
class and derivative actions); Dam, supra note 116, at 59 (providing examples of actions
which courts have allowed to settle against the wishes of class representatives); see also
Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir.) ("[N]amed plaintiffs should not be
permitted to hold the absentee class hostage by refusing to assent to an otherwise fair and
adequate settlement . . . ."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982); Kincade v. Gen. Tire &
Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that five of six named plaintiffs
could not prevent settlement in Title VII action); Pettway IV, 576 F.2d at 1176 ("Mhe
class attorney must not allow decisions on behalf of the class to rest exclusively with the
named plaintiffs."); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1174 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding
that settlement approval over objections of the three original plaintiffs was not an abuse
of discretion), cert. denied 424 U.S. 967 (1976). But see Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d
896 (2d Cir. 1972) (refusing to uphold settlement to which one plaintiff stockholder objected). The court in Pettway IV observed:
The class itself often speaks in several voices. Where there is disagreement
among the class members concerning an appropriate course of action, it may be
impossible for the class attorney to do more than act in what he believes to be
the best interests of the class as a whole . . . . [Hiowever, at some point
objections from the class may become so numerous that in a very real sense it
can be said that "the class" has not agreed to the proposal.
576 F.2d at 1216.
225. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 14 (describing a plaintiffs inability to
effectively evaluate his or her attorney's work even in the context of a traditional lawsuit).
226. See id. (describing quality control options for plaintiffs in traditional lawsuits).
227. Id. at 41; see also Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiofs Attorney, supra note 41, at
679 ("[B]ecause the attorney as private enforcer looks to the court, not the client, to
award him a fee if successful, the attorney can find the legal violation first and the client
second:').
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cerned about their reputations among judges and members of the
defense bar than with the opinions of their clients."2 The experience and ability of the plaintiffs' lawyer can affect a judge's decision on lead counsel appointments 2 9 and fee awards, so the attorney necessarily wishes to impress the court. Moreover, the
plaintiffs' attorney wishes to appear before defense attorneys as a
hard-nosed opponent, but one willing to compromise in settlement
negotiations.23 Indeed, either or both of the parties' attorneys
may be "repeat players," anxious to create or maintain reputations
for toughness which will benefit them in the current case and any
future litigation.a Further, even if the attorney desired greater
input from the class, communications on a broad scale could jeopardize the security of sensitive informationY 2
Appeals as well as settlements can raise conflict of interests
between the attorney and the class. The attorney may want to
"cash in" his or her fee award rather than spend additional time
and effort on an appeal which may be in the interests of the
class. 3 The court in Pettway IV observed that neither the
plaintiff's attorney nor the named representative has unilateral
authority to decide upon an appeal.' 4 Yet, the court concluded,
"at least as an initial matter, the decision to appeal a class action
'
judgment must rest with the class plaintiffs."235
Given the American judicial system's allocation of decisions regarding basic objectives to the client, 6 some effort should be
228. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 21 (noting that, in the absence of client
monitoring, only judges and defense counsel may be likely to refer plaintiffs' attorneys to
a bar disciplinary board).
229. "[A] potentially valuable franchise." In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693
n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
230. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 21.
231. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 702 (noting
that defendants or their insurance companies may want to resist "extortion" and thus may
prefer trial over settlement); id. at 713 (arguing that plaintiff's attorney can gain future
advantages from refusing reasonable settlement offers).
232. See Lazos, supra note 20, at 317 (discussing possibility that pre-trial communication with class could endanger class' bargaining power at settlement proceedings if confidentiality is compromised).
233. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 43.
234. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1176-78
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
235. Pettway IV, 576 F.2d at 1177. The American Law Institute tentatively has approved the assignment to the client of the prerogative of deciding upon an appeal in a
civil or criminal case. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 1992).
236. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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made to consult the absent class members as well as the named
representatives before conferring such an important prerogative
upon the class attorney. Such efforts can be costly, repeating the
notice dilemmas which often plague class actions. 2 7 Since notice
costs can easily exceed the small individual recoveries at stake in a
class action, the legal community should be forced to consider
whether the goals of a class action, namely deterrence of defendant
misconduct and remuneration for the attorneys, justify the expenditure of court time and the potentially enormous expense involved.
Attorneys stand to benefit most from the large-scale, small claim
class action." Therefore, it is in their interests to control the settlement and appeals decisions for their own advantage. Arguably,
the attorneys should be required to consult with at least a representative sampling of the class, beyond the named plaintiffs, before
making important decisions affecting the case.2 9 Alternatively, or
in addition, the attorneys could consult with a guardian ad litem
appointed by the court. The guardian could give the court an additional perspective on the factors involved in the attorneys' decisions regarding the class, thus strengthening the supervisory powers
of the court. Using a representative sampling of the class allows
more input from class members without incurring ruinous notice
costs, while the guardian can provide monitoring from a
knowledgeable perspective normally unavailable to class members.
2.

Monitoring by Investor-Attorneys

The idea of attorney-investors in an ad hoc law firm has some
appeal as an efficient "market mimicking" strategy.2' The advantages of this approach include the spreading the litigation risk
among attorneys' portfolios and enhancing the access of plaintiffs
to sources of funding.24 Attorney-investors are potentially better
monitors than lay plaintiffs or investors because of their profes-

237. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
238. See Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits: The 23rd Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 10 (1971) ("[]t is
the attorneys, not the class members, who are the true beneficiaries and the real parties in

interest.").
239. See Ricciuti, supra note 19, at 852-54 (proposing a "new ethical duty" for the
class attorney to consult "with the consultation unit as if it were the sole client in the

case").
240. Coffee, The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation, supra note 47, at 934-35.
241. Id. at 901, 934.
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sional expertise.24 2 Concomitantly, professional attorneys have an
advantage over lay investors in their increased ability to influence
the actual course of the litigation in a substantive way through
their votes on plaintiffs' management committees. In the Agent
Orange example, the PMC was stacked with twice the number of
investors as non-investor litigators. Even if a PMC operated on
some basis other than majority vote, the weight of the investors'
interests surely would be felt in the decision-making process. Restrictions on the ability of attorney-investors to command a majority among plaintiffs' counsel could help mitigate their influence,
unless of course the entire plaintiffs' counsel team were comprised
of such investors.243 At that point, requiring the plaintiffs' counsel
to consult with a selected group of plaintiffs and a guardian ad
litem could provide oversight essential to protecting the interests of
the class.
From an economic perspective, legal expertise theoretically
should enable the attorney-investors to assess realistically the risks
of litigation. Accurate projections would permit what is essentially
lending to occur at a lower rate than lay investors would
charge.' The Second Circuit, of course, found otherwise when it
looked askance at the 300% rate of return envisioned by the Agent
Orange investor-attorneys.
[W]e find wholly unconvincing the district court's suggestion that the investors could have made a sizable return on
their funds if they had invested them in other ventures. We
take notice of the fact that a threefold return on one's
money is a rather generous return in any market over a
short period of time.24
Even Judge Weinstein, who approved the agreement, noted that the
philosophy of compensation for attorneys in common fund cases
was adequacy, not generosity. 2'

242. Id. at 934-35.
243. One commentator who supports lawsuit syndication in general flatly rejects the
notion of allowing investors a voice in controlling the lawsuit. Cox, supra note 29, at
165 & nn.116-19.
244. See Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 47, at 901
(arguing that both attorney investors and attorney debtors could benefit from this relationship because investors could monitor debtors more effectively and at less cost).
245. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 926 (1987).
246. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1303-04 (E.D.N.Y.
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The usury argument of the Second Circuit could be attacked on
the basis that, if anything, investors had incentive to delay settlement in order to accumulate more expenses and thus increase their
return.24 This argument is unconvincing because the limited,, albeit large, resources of each investor could be swallowed up quickly by the expenses of complex litigation. The main point, however,
is not whether the incentives lead attorneys to settle earlier for a
quick return, or later for a higher return, but rather that the incentive is to settle as opposed to taking a potentially winning case to
trial. "Ultimately, the most persuasive account of why class actions
frequently produce unsatisfactory results is the hypothesis that such
actions are uniquely vulnerable to collusive settlements that benefit
plaintiff's attorneys rather than their clients." 4" Given the less
intensive scrutiny devoted to fee awards presented as part of a settlement package,249 it seems more realistic to assume investors
would take a quick threefold profit rather than risk losing everything at trial. Even commentators who advocate the elimination of
ethical rules on champerty, maintenance, and fee-splitting in large
class actions," concede:
[T]he inherent conflict of interest between attorney and
client over the matter of settlement is conceptually more
acute when costs, rather than fees, are at issue .... The
attorney who has advanced costs subject to a risk of nonsuccess would much prefer to settle out at a low sum in
order to assure that the costs will be repaid."'
The acute conflict of interest described above would be even more
significant when the settlement assures the investor-attorney of
three times his or her cost incurred, free of any risks associated
with trial.

1985) ("'[A] reasonable attorney's fee' is one that is 'adequate to attract competent counsel, but . . . [that does] not produce windfalls to attorneys."' (quoting Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984))), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
247. Coffee, The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation, supra note 47, at 902.
248. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 677.
249. See infra part Ill.D.5.b.
250. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
251. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 86-87. The term "costs" in this context refers

to the myriad expenses incurred by the attorneys in preparing the case. The lump sums
advanced by the Agent Orange attorneys were expended to cover items such as travel,
expert witness fees, depositions, assembly and review of medical records, administrative
overhead, and legal research. ScHuCK, supra note 1, at 50.
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Conflicts Between Litigating and Investing Attorneys

Conflicts between investors and litigators can compromise the
representation of the class, 2 especially when the conflicts are
concealed from the court. Victor Yannacone's partners in the original consortium struggled to control his activities while preventing
him from making good on his threat to report the consortium's internal conflicts to the court. 3 A challenge in early 1981 by outside lawyers to the original plaintiffs' consortium's handling of
documents and information was unsuccessful, in part because Judge
George C. Pratt fortuitously was "oblivious" to the consortium's
internal disarray.' As one of Yannacone's associates described
the situation: "Victor . . . was totally unpredictable, an unguided
missile. To destroy the enemy he would willingly risk blowing his
'
own side up."255
Such a damaging report could lead to the removal of the consortium as lead counsel, destroy its claim to the
lion's share of any fee award, 6 and relegate it to the sidelines of
the litigation. Thus, intractable conflict within the plaintiffs' camp
can reduce the effectiveness of representation and make settlement
more attractive than continued litigation. 7
The incentives which motivate investors and litigators also
differ according to the stage of the litigation. Pretrial settlement is
more attractive to investors paying expenses, when costs are frontloaded before trial, than to litigators, whose time will add up during a lengthy trial."5 Investors who are guaranteed a substantial
return regardless of whether the settlement comes later rather than
earlier, might be content to wait. However, it is more likely that
they would prefer to take their compounded return and invest it
once again elsewhere. 9
It is possible that any bias toward settlement on the part of the

252. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 202.
253. Id. at 54.
254. Id. at 74-75.
255. Id. at 54.
256. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (noting
the potentially valuable franchise interest inherent in a lead counsel appointment); infra
notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
257. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 690 n.58
(citing instances of premature settlement due to instability within the plaintiffs camp).
258. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 121.
259. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1461 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987) (discussing incentives to settle early versus incentives to prolong litigation).
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Agent Orange investors was counterbalanced by the reduced incentive for settlement among the litigators.' However, a litigator
who has assigned part of his or her recovery to an investor may
lack the incentive to proceed with litigation and risk an already
reduced award on the chance of a greater recovery."6 As a prac-

tical matter, the investors in the Agent Orange case outnumbered
the litigators by six to three. The investors had final authority in
key decisions, especially regarding expenses and settlement, despite

their relative lack of familiarity with the case and the inconsequential number of actual clients they represented. 62

4. Prohibitions on Fee-Splitting
The basic objection to fee-splitting codified in ethical rules263
is the unwarranted increase in legal costs caused by the payment of
referral fees.2" In contrast, lawyers are entitled to divide fees
260. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 55 (discussing the competing incentives for
both litigators and investors in the fee allocation arrangement).
261. Johnson, supra note 72, at 563. In the Agent Orange case, Benton Musslewhite recruited two Houston attorneys, Newton Schwartz and John O'Quinn, by selling them a
share in Musslewhite's interest in any fee awarded. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 121. Referring to a character in the Mel Brooks movie, THE PRODUCERS, David Dean, the plaintiffs'
chief litigator, joked that financial pressures had turned Musslewhite into "the Max
Bialystok of the legal profession; he sold 10,000 percent of his case." Id.
262. See SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 124 (noting that only Musslewhite and Schlegel represented a significant number of veterans); Weinstein, supra note 157, at 531 (discussing
the lack of client contact among the members of the PMC).
263. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at DR 2-107(A):
A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is
not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full
disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and
responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable
compensation for all legal services they rendered the client.
See also MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule 1.5(e):
A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made
only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint
responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of
all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
The comments to Rule 1.5 add: "[Paragraph (e)] does not require disclosure to the client
of the share that each lawyer is to receive." Id. at Rule 1.5 cmt. 4.
264. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 553 n.55 (describing other rationales for the prohi-
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within a firm as they see fit, in part on the theory that their competing interests will assure a rational division of fees.6 Further,
monitoring of in-house fee splitting would be impracticable.2"
Fee-splitting prohibitions, then, address "the most egregious cases:
those involving no more than straight referral or perfunctory participation in a client's representation by a forwarding attorney. 267
The PMC fee agreement did not violate these ethical prohibitions
on fee-splitting from a public policy perspective because the investor-attorneys were appointed by the court and enjoyed a "constructive attorney-client relationship with absent class members. 21 68 All
members of the PMC freely assented to its terms and some would
argue that the 300% return was justifiable in view of the risk of
the litigation. 269 However, the actual level of risk at the time of
the agreement is dubious in view of the fact that only ten percent
of all civil cases actually come to trial27 and in this case there
was a substantial possibility of settlement.
Functionally, if not technically, the PMC more closely resembled a traditional law firm than a referral relationship.27' Judge
Weinstein ruled that the PMC constituted an ad hoc law firm,
"formed for the purpose of prosecuting the Agent Orange
multidistrict litigation,' 272 thus giving the PMC a legitimate basis
upon which to divide its fees. Judge Weinstein did not distinguish
sharply between the roles of partners in a law firm, whose shares
in firm profits are related only indirectly to individual cases, and
the members of the PMC, who could increase their remuneration

bition against fee-splitting and concluding that they do not apply to the Agent Orange
PMC agreement).
265. Id. at 557.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 558.
269. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 55.
270. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 35, at 772 (stating that only about 2.5 percent
of cases are lost at trial, although the investors' level of risk aversion would naturally increase if settlement gave way to trial).
271. Johnson, supra note 72, at 558-59.
272. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1458 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987); see Weinstein,
supra note 157, at 525-26 ("Law firms make internal arrangments giving greater financial
rewards to rainmakers and partner-investors. I saw no reason to prevent a similar arrangement for the committee charged with conducting the litigation."). Such an ad hoc law
firm can be created by direction from the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation or by
voluntary association as in the Agent Orange case. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs
Attorney, supra note 41, at 708-09 & n.111.
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directly by voting to settle a single case. The Second Circuit, in a
key part of its opinion, rejected Judge Weinstein's characterization
of the PMC. "We do not find class counsel to have formed an ad
hoe partnership. They merely are a group of individual lawyers and
law firms associated in the prosecution of a single lawsuit, and
they lack the ongoing relationship that is the essential element of
attorneys practicing as partners."273
In point of fact, the fee-splitting rules do not mandate any type
of on-going relationship: attorneys may split fees among those who
are in their firm on the day the fee is divided.274 A PMC-type of
association did not exist when the ethical rules were devised, and
the Second Circuit's application of those rules to the Agent Orange
fee-sharing arrangement has been labeled as "wooden."275 The
district court, in contrast, implicitly applied the Model Rules, which
permit a division of fees with the consent of the client and assumption of joint responsibility for representation.276
In the Agent Orange case, the district court's assessment was
more realistic for a class action situation. Court approval satisfied
the client consent and joint responsibility requirements,' m given
that client notification, much less consent, is impractical in a class
action." The plaintiffs' attorneys clearly were not members of a
traditional law firm, and in fact most of them maintained their
practices elsewhere during the litigation. There was, however, a
division of responsibility for the case which represented a certain
amount of teamwork.279 Leaving aside the investment aspects of
the fee agreement, the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys from across the
country chose to work together on a massive litigation should not

273. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 926 (1987).
274. Johnson, supra note 72, at 559.

275. Id. at 560.
276. MODEL RuLES, supra note 30, at Rule 1.5(e)(1); see In re "Agent Orange," 611 F.
Supp. at 1459 (stating that the PMC agreement clearly reflects the Model Rules); Johnson,
supra note 72, at 561 (describing the manner in which the court implicitly approved the
Model Rules).
277. In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1459. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 561
(describing the district court's assessment of the PMC's fee arrangement as realistic for a
class action situation).
278. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 102 (discussing the impracticality of gaining consent of all class members to a class action suit); see also Rhode, supra note 61,
at 1235 (describing some humorous responses to class notifications).
279. See, e.g., SCHuCK, supra note 1, at 109 (describing the division of responsibilities
among the plaintiffs' lawyers under the three-man PMC of Schlegel, Musslewhite, and
Henderson).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:291

in itself have constituted a basis for invalidating their fee agreement. The PMC did not violate the spirit of ethical prohibitions on
fee-splitting because of its office arrangements. Far more important
was the fact that some members of the PMC were little more than
2 '
"passive investor[s],""
creating a situation in which "those who
advanced money [were] advantaged to an extraordinary degree over
'
those who gave their time and skill to the enterprise."281
Feesplitting was merely a straw man in the debate over the propriety
of a secret agreement which contravened both the letter and the
spirit of the fee arrangements sanctioned by the district court.
5.

The Attorney's Relationship with the Court under Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
a.

Appointment of lead counsel

As part of its supervisory responsibilities, the court appoints
lead counsel in class actions and consolidations. 2 Power, prestige, and money accompany such appointments.2 3 In most cases
an attorney on the plaintiffs management committee will be able
to command a higher fee award than one who bills the same number of hours as a staff attorney on the plaintiff's side. 2 Maintaining a high level of visibility before the court also can be crucial to winning various multipliers under the lodestar approach.2
Referring to the In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, one commentator noted: 'Titles were a valued commodity, since lawyers in
'leadership' roles can more easily petition the court for fee 'multipliers,' allowing them to double or triple their normal hourly bill'
ings."286
Perhaps reflecting a dislike for the notion of litigation as
an entrepreneurial activity,287 recent Supreme Court decisions have

280. Id. at 203.
281. Id. at 202.
282. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND § 20.224 (1985).
283. See Weinstein, supra note 157, at 532 ("The monetary awards, the power, and the
prestige associated with control of mass cases are enormous.").
284. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 713.
285. See Weinstein, supra note 157, at 532-33 ("Given the relatively small national bar
capable of managing a large masstort [sic] action, the amount of handwashing and backbiting can be substantial.").
286. Reading Moody's at $682 an Hour, AM. LAW., Jan. 1982, at 31, quoted in Coffee,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 713 n.l17.
287. See Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 47, at 897
(arguing that the courts' unwillingness to oversee contingency fees in class action litiga-
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restricted the use of fee multipliers." Nonetheless, plaintiffs' attorneys jockey for position to gain the lion's share of any fee the
court decides to award.

9

Notwithstanding such maneuvering,"

an agreement among attorneys which uses their cost outlay as a
base figure upon which to calculate a multiple reimbursement is
one way of evading the supervisory role of the court in reviewing

appropriate fee allocation. Clearly the client class members in the
Agent Orange case had no input into the allocation of fees among
their attorneys, leaving the court as the only avenue of review. In
their case, that avenue was foreclosed by the district judge's ignorance of counsel fee arrangements, and opened by the appellate
court only after the case effectively ended with settlement.

b. Court monitoring of conflicts of interest in settlement
A more acute problem in the litigation investment context is
the court's ability and incentive to monitor conflicts of interest in
the settlement process. Some commentators are fairly sanguine
about the efficacy of court supervision: "Presumably the necessity
for obtaining court approval before class claims are aborted will
deter counsel from acting contrary to the interests of absent class
members. 29' However, one experienced lawyer shrewdly observed
that "'the fundamental assumption underlying the finding of man-

ageability in the certification of large user class actions is the
court's belief that the case will be settled prior to trial."' '2r 2
Most courts take seriously their responsibilities under Rule

tion stems in part from their reluctance to view the attorney as an entrepreneur).
288. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643 (1992) (rejecting contingency enhancement for prevailing party in fee-shifting case); Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley 11), 483 U.S. 711, 723-27 (1987)
(limiting, by a 4-1-4 decision, multipliers for risk of non-payment to exceptional cases);
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley 1), 478
U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (restricting merit or skill multipliers in fee-shifting case); Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-99 (1984) (stating that the lodestar approach reflects the novelty or difficulty of the issues in the hours expended, and the quality of representation in
the hourly rate).
289. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 257 (1985) (Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force) ("[G]reat care must be taken to avoid patronage and discrimination . . . in the selection of litigation counsel when there is a competition for that position."); Weinstein, supra note 157, at 532-33 (noting that jockeying among potential representatives becomes "fierce").
290. Such maneuvering can include fee-sharing deals and vote buying. Weinstein, supra
note 157, at 533 & no.259-60.
291. Underwood, supra note 66, at 825.
292. Id. at 817-18.
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23(e), recognizing that "[iln such circumstances, the role of the
attorneys is drastically altered; they then stand in essentially an
adversarial relation to their clients who face a reduced award to the
extent that counsel fees are maximized. 293 Courts tend to look
more closely at fee awards in common fund cases where any
award reduces the recovery of the plaintiff class, while in common
benefit and fee-shifting cases,2 9 the defendant may object to
the fee request and give the judge reasons to trim the fee
award.296 Without a defendant, the lack of opposition to settlement puts judges, normally impartial arbitrators, at a disadvantage.297 Without a guardian or other assistance, a judge is faced
with the prospect of watching "the attorneys for the plaintiff...

link arms with their former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork . . . .All the dynamics conduce to judicial approval of such
29 In defense of conscientious jurists, the problem
settlements.""
may be one of "institutional rather than individual insensitivity." 2' Court supervision is necessary as long as the attorneys'

293. Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1109 (3d Cir. 1979).
294. In common benefit cases, the attorney's efforts result in a non-monetary benefit to
the client, usually a corporation in a shareholder derivative suit. Macey & Miller, supra
note 33, at 25.
295. In fee-shifting cases, the plaintiff's attorneys' fee is shifted to the losing defendant.
Id.
296. See id. at 49 (noting that in common benefit and fee-shifting cases the defendant
may appear at the fee hearing to contest the fee award).
297. In explaining its rationale for appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the class
in determining attorney fees, one court explained:
The initial difficulty in setting counsel fees when a guardian is not appointed
revolves around the defendants' total indifference to the proceedings. Having
agreed to contribute a fixed sum of money in settlement of the suit, the proportion of the fund allocated to counsel fees is of no moment to the defendants . . . .The dilemma thereby created for the Court finds the judge playing
"devil's advocate" on behalf of the disinterested defendants, while at the same
time attempting to exercise his impartiality in making a just determination of
reasonable fees. To require the judge to occupy an adversary position during
the fee proceedings is highly inconsistent with his acknowledged duty to act as
an impartial arbitrator. The appointment of a guardian for the class obviates
this considerable problem of judicial schizophrenia.
Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382, 383 (W.D. Pa. 1977); see also Rhode,
supra note 61, at 1219 (stating that judges who oversee the fee aspects of settlement,
where neither defense counsel nor class members object, find themselves in an unpopular
position).
298. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), aff'd en banc by an equally divided Court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
299. Rhode, supra note 61, at 1220.
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interests diverge from those of the class, but too often such supervision of settlements and fee applications is "haphazard, unreliable,
and lacking in administrable standards."3"
Courts under pressure to keep litigation moving are unlikely to
be alert to ethical violations such as conflicts of interest, which
may lead to inappropriate settlements.0 1 The Federal Rules themselves encourage judges to promote settlement through procedural
mechanisms such as the pre-trial conference. 3°2 The Advisory
Committee notes state: "Since [settlement] obviously eases crowded
court dockets and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial
system, settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the
3 3 Similarly, the Federal Rules of Evidence
litigation as possible.""

limit the adverse use of information gained from settlement negotiations on the "consistently impressive ground ...

of the public

policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes." 3"
One court frankly proclaimed the common attitude towards settle-

ment: "In deciding whether to approve this settlement proposal, the
court starts from the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost
always better than a good trial. 3 5
Thus predisposed, courts are particularly willing to see class
actions settled.re Judges easily can approve fee awards presented
as part of a settlement package, even if they suspect some degree
of untoward cooperation between the two sides on the fee issue. 3 7 Judges might be tempted to ignore any such suspicion to
300. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 4. See also Lazos, supra note 20, at 310 ("[I]n
practice, the current judicial scrutiny of class action settlements neither prevents abuse nor
effectively protects the interests of the absentee class.").
301. Some members of the Third Circuit Task Force were concerned that judges would
favor early settlement irrespective of the merits of an action, in order to clear their dockets. Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 262 n.79 (1985) (Report of The Third
Circuit Task Force); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 21 & nn.57, 45 (noting
the incentives that judges have to approve settlements in order to clear their dockets);
Rhode, supra note 61, at 1219 (arguing that trial courts faced with heavy caseloads and
the pressure to clear dockets may be reluctant to "smok[e] out conflict" in a settlement
agreement).
302. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (giving judges the discretion to hold conferences to
facilitate settlement); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 46 & n.134 (noting that
settlement is one of the objectives of the pre-trial conference).
303. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note.
304. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
305. In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Lazos, supra note 20, at 308 n.2 (citing cases
which refer to the benefits of settling class actions).
306. See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that the scarcity of judicial resouces creates an "overriding public interest" in settling class actions).
307. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 49 (describing judges' authority to grant
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avoid the chore of scrutinizing the details of an attorney's fee
request, which has been described as a "cumbersome, enervating,
3 8 Such scrutiny "essentially places
and often surrealistic process.""
the court in the position of a public utility commission that regulates the 'fair' return the attorney receives."" Understandably,
courts are less than enthusiastic about assuming such burdens in
light of their already heavy responsibilities.3 0 The court might
also have in mind that approving a settlement advanced by both

parties to a suit carries very little chance of appeal, while rejecting
a settlement can lead to appeal and reversal.3 1' As Rule 23 does
not confer authority clearly on judges to modify settlements, but
refers only to approval authority,312 judges have an additional incentive to approve proposed settlements.
Certain obstacles confront judges who do seek to scrutinize fee
requests made in conjunction with settlement. Judges may be
forced to make a decision on settlement with an inadequate documentary record.313 An objector to the settlement may provide
more information, but without an objector, the court has little with
which to evaluate the fairness of the settlement.3" 4 In complex
litigation with many participating attorneys, the court may be unable to evaluate the efficacy of coordination time and effort required to run the PMC.3" In the Agent Orange case, Judge
Weinstein refused to compensate the PMC for time spent in coordination and financing activities316 despite the necessity of that
fee requests).
308. Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 258 (1985) (Report of the Third
Circuit Task Force) (referring to both preparing and evaluating fee requests); see also
Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 48 (describing judges' reluctance to set attorneys'
fees).
309. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 691.
310. Id. at 691 n.62 ("When the fee petition hearing consumes nearly as much judicial
time as the litigation of the substantive merits, it appears that the tail has begun to wag
the dog.").
311. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 46.
312. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory committee's note; see also Lazos, supra note
20, at 322 n.82 (noting that it is unclear whether courts have the power to reformulate
defective settlements).
313. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 46 & nn.135-36 (describing difficulty judges face in obtaining information on settlement agreements); see also Lazos, supra note 20,
at 329 n.110 (explaining that, in ruling on settlement agreements, courts may be hindered
by lack of information).
314. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 714 n.121.
315. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 51 (explaining the difficulties courts face
in calculating fees in class actions when many attorneys are involved).
316. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 198 (detailing the attorneys' fees and costs which were
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activity in directing the litigation. Without substantial reto effectively review each settlement proposal and fee
many courts find their wrists shackled when they prepare
up a complex case.
6., Public Perceptions

The Second Circuit opinion invalidating the PMC fee agreement stressed the significance of public perceptions of the role of
the attorneys in the case. "[P]otential conflicts of interest in class
contexts are not examined solely for the actual abuse they may
cause, but also for potential public misunderstandings they may
cultivate in regard to the interests of class counsel."3'17 The court
noted the feeling shared by many class members and the general
public that the settlement, which produced an individual death
benefit of $3400 and a disability benefit of $12,800,318 represented inadequate compensation for the perceived harms of Agent
Orange.3t9 Many veterans felt that the PMC had betrayed them
and sold out their cause, which had been motivated by a desire to
bring their story before the public.2 0 In that context, the court
found the potentially negative public reaction to the enormous
dichotomy between the fees awarded by the district judge and the
fees actually collected by the individual attorneys to be additional
justification for overriding the PMC agreement in favor of the
lodestar approach. 2'
In this opinion, the Second Circuit reflected frequent judicial
skepticism about attorneys' fees in class actions." One court
characterized class action complaints as a "'port from which to
embark on a large scale fishing expedition."' 3 An earlier Second
Circuit panel concurred, decrying a class action which "'has result-

awarded in the Agent Orange case); see id. at 121 (quoting Stephen Schlegel's description
of the management of the Agent Orange case as an "administrative nightmare").
317. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 926 (1987).
318. SCHUCK, supra note 1,at 220.
319. In re "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 225. See also SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 174
(noting that almost every witness at the fairness hearings thought the settlement was very

inadequate).
320. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 175.
321. In re "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 225.
322. Id. See also Lazos, supra note 20, at 310 n.10 (discussing in detail various cases
of abuse in economically-motivated class actions).
323. Peak v. Topeka Hous. Auth., 78 F.R.D. 78, 84 (). Kan. 1978) (quoting
defendant's brief).
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ed in minuscule recoveries by its intended beneficiaries while lawyers have reaped a golden harvest of fees."' 324 Some commentators note in particular the resentment of profiteering by attorneys
who file private suits on the heels of government actions, e.g.,
securities, bankruptcy, or antitrust actions."s Professor Milton
so far as to call antitrust class actions "legalized
Handler went
3 26
blackmail.
On the other hand, public perception that class actions lead to
negative results and serve only to line attorneys' pockets may be a
necessary evil: "[T]here is really little choice but to permit lawyers,
self-seeking though they may be, to dignify themselves with the
label of private attorney general, finance the litigation as necessity
demands, and do battle with those whose wrongs have taken a
'
The key issue is that
small amount from each of a multitude."327
of "financ[ing] the litigation as necessity demands. 3 2 The Second Circuit crafted an opinion discarding that utilitarian perspective
in favor of an approach consistent with the profession's history and
ethical codes, rejecting even "the appearance of impropriety."329
The tension between beneficial private enforcement of the law by
the plaintiffs' bar and the conflicts of interest which accompany
creative attorney financing could be resolved at least in part by
requiring those attorneys to pay for the additional supervision necessitated by the entrepreneurial aspects of their legal ventures.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The conflict of interest problem in the Agent Orange case
clearly troubled everyone who considered it.330 The fundamental

324. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Free
World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
325. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 115 n.341 ("[Tihe available empirical evidence suggests that [derivative] actions regularly follow in the wake of prior proceedings
by the SEC or other governmental agency.").
326. Handler, supra note 238, at 9 ("Any device which is workable only because it
utilizes the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a
rule of procedure-it is a form of legalized blackmail.").
327. Findlater, supra note 34, at 1677. In a similar vein, Professor Dam suggests that
the deterrent function of the class action assumes primary importance when compensation
is unrealistic, such as when the individual claims are so small that class members will
not bother to claim them. Dam, supra note 116, at 60.
328. Findlater, supra note 34, at 1677.
329. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at EC 9-6.
330. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 303-04 (recounting an exchange between Judge
Winter of the Second Circuit and Leon Friedman, David Dean's attorney in Dean's appeal
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problem was money; complex cases, especially class actions, require a lot of it331 and the Agent Orange case was a prime example. One step toward reform would clarify the role of the named
representative in shouldering the expenses of the suit. One commentator has suggested that a corporation or other formal association comprised of class members could function as the named
representative, providing a "sturdier financial base" ' for the litigation. Such a proposal might work in a shareholder derivative
context, where the names and addresses of the putative owners are
accessible, but seems unlikely to succeed in a typical amorphous,
consumer-based class action with little at stake for unidentified
individual plaintiffs. At bottom, most commentators seem to agree
on the wisdom of ending the charade that the class representatives
will bear the costs of litigation.333 Once the onus of that liability
is removed, their attorney may have a wider choice of parties
qualified and willing to become the representative plaintiffs.
The class counsel should be required to make a good faith
effort to select representative plaintiffs who not only meet the
criteria of Rule 23, but exhibit the best potential for understanding
and contributing to the development of the case.334 The court
should exercise its discretion, perhaps in private interviews with the

of the PMC fee agreement).
331. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on Judge Weinstein's Ethical Dilemmas in
Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 569, 572 (1994) ("Money is thus both the
compelling object of this kind of litigation [mass torts] and the means by which it has
taken its distinctive form."); Weinstein, supra note 157, at 524 & n.238 (noting that expenses in mass cases are "astronomical" and discussing tobacco litigation as an example
of expensive class action litigation).
332. Paul Bergman, Class Action Lawyers: -Foolsfor Clients?, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
243, 274 (1980).
333. See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
Model Code is "long in the tooth and being replaced [by the Model Rules]"); Weinstein,
supra note 157, at 524 (arguing that compensatory function of mass tort cases is so important to society that clients should not be required to finance them).
334. See Underwood, supra note 66, at 788 (noting that at least one court has required
the representative plaintiff to have a "'keen interest in the progress and outcome of the
litigation"'); In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592, 595 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (noting,
however, that "[e]ven unknowledgeable and inexperienced Plaintiffs might meet the requirements of Rule 23 by demonstrating a keen interest in the . . . litigation"). But c.f.
Piel v. National Semiconductor Corp., 86 F.R.D. 357, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1980), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 903 (1985) (rejecting the Goldchip view and requiring only that a class representative proceed with the "requisite vigor and in the interests of the class"); Chevalier v.
Baird Sav. Assoc., 72 F.R.D. 140, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (requiring plaintiff to have sophisticated knowledge of a complex case would reduce the class action to "an impotent
tool").
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representative plaintiffs, to determine whether a guardian should be
appointed as an additional safeguard. Where novel or complex
issues are involved, the court should assume a guardian will be
needed and appoint one at the expense of the class counsel. 35
Once the burden of financing is removed from the representative plaintiffs and placed squarely upon the plaintiffs' attorney, the
court can insist upon clear funding arrangements as part of its

decisions on appointing lead counsel. Judge Weinstein's "'sunshine'
'
rule"336
would prevent back room dealings which effectively
evade the court's scrutiny. Full disclosure of financing and compensation issues early in the proceedings will allow the court to
evaluate whether the plaintiffs' case may be compromised by inadequate financing, something the plaintiffs' attorney has every incentive to conceal.337
In searching for funds, plaintiffs' attorneys typically have been
limited to bank financing338 because of ethical limitations on the
division of fees339 and the formation of partnerships with lay persons.' The tremendous amount of money required to finance

335. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114. S. Ct. 1125 (1994) (stating that "we ordinarily would anticipate the
appointment of a guardian to represent the interests of absent claimants, particularly those
with questionable injuries" but holding nonetheless that the interests of claimants whose
injuries were not manifest at the time of the earlier settlement were represented adequately
by class counsel).
336. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987). Judge Weinstein
emphasized the importance of making information available through the court in cases
where the attorneys lack any personal relationship with class members. Id. at 1462.
337. See id. at 1463 (describing advantages of early disclosure). The Third Circuit Task
Force recommended a negotiated percentage fee arrangement for traditional common fund
cases and those statutory fee cases likely to create a res from which attorneys' fees could
be paid. The Task Force retained a modified Lindy method for "the typical statutory fee
case involving the declaration or enforcement of rights or relatively modest sums of money." Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 255 (1985) (Report of the Third
Circuit Task Force). The Task Force specified that the court should act on its own initiative, if necessary, to establish a negotiated percentage agreement "at the earliest practicable moment," id. at 255, which it defined as "immediately after the pleadings are closed
and before discovery is fully underway." Id. at 255 n.62.
338. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 41, at 706-07 n.104
(explaining the limitations placed on plaintiffs' attorneys in securing financing).
339. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at DR 3-102(A) ("A lawyer or law firnm shall not
share legal fees with a non-lawyer ....
"); MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule 5.4(a)
("A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer .... ").
340. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at DR 3-103(A) ("A lawyer shall not form a
partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the
practice of law."); MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at 5.4(b) ("A lawyer shall not form a
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large-scale litigation is beyond the borrowing capacity of most

individual attorneys,"' such as those who comprised the initial
consortium of Agent Orange plaintiffs' counsel. In an effort to
limit costs, the size of the class could be restricted to minimize the
amount of money the counsel advances.

2

That approach has

drawbacks in an action for damages, where the cases of many injured persons would benefit from class treatment. The size of the
class has an obvious effect on the size of the award and thus the
counsel fees which may be approved, so limiting the class size
may defeat some of the advantages of the class action format. 3

Amending the notice requirements in class actions to permit less
expensive forms of notification to class members would cut many
of the initial expenses of the suit. This action might be appropriate
in consumer litigation where the individual class members have
nothing of significant value at stake and the main purpose of the
action is the curb the defendant's behavior.
One commentator has advocated, in effect, institutionalizing the

PMC fee agreement by creating a risk multiplier for expenses.'
Giving attorneys a risk premium for expenses advanced, as well as
for fees, would increase the attorney's recovery and theoretically
minimize the effect of champerty in inducing settlement."

This

approach assumes that the risk factor and opportunity cost of advancing expenses is not built into the attorney's decision to undertake the case. It also places an additional burden upon the fund

partnership with a non lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the
practice of law.").
341. In dealing with traditional law firms, banks rely on retainer agreements and other
indicia of credit-worthiness. Plaintiffs' firms operating on contingency fees have difficulty
in securing credit based on future earnings, so for the most part their borrowing is restricted to the collateral value of their personal assets. Coffee, Understanding the
Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 41, at 707 n.104.
342. See, e.g., Rode v. Emery Air Freight, 80 F.R.D. 314, 317 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (reducing class size from nationwide to judicial district to minimize conflicts caused by
plaintiffs attorney's advancement of funds); P.D.Q. Inc. of Miami v. Nissan Motor Corp.,
61 F.R.D. 372, 381 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aJrd sub nom. In re Nissan Antitrust Litig., 577
F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979) (restricting nationwide class
action to purchasers of autos within a two-county area when plaintiffs were unwilling to
pay costs of notice).
343. Limiting the size of the class could also have implications for the numerosity
prerequisite in Rule 23(a)(1). See supra note 3.
344. See Findlater, supra note 34, at 1674-75 (arguing that allowing a risk premium on
both the hourly fee award and expenses advanced would minimize the effect of champerty
in inducing settlements).
345. Id.
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recovered for the class. These concerns are reflected in recent Supreme Court decisions restricting contingency enhancements in feeshifting cases.' Presumably the Court would have the same negative reaction to risk multipliers for expenses.
Private contractual arrangements among attorneys to divide fees
on an agreed-upon basis should not be invalidated automatically by
the courts. There is precedent in the intra-firm example for allowing attorneys to decide the value of their various contributions to
the common scheme." 7 Wealthy attorneys may be the most accessible source of funds for plaintiffs' counsel, and in some cases
their expertise may be as valuable as their cash. There remains,
however, the insistence of the profession's codes of ethics3" 8 and
the courts 349 that the attorneys' remuneration have some relationship to the legal services performed for the client. In that sense
attorneys involved in the case cannot simply assign themselves the
role of banker and vote for the highest possible return on their
investments. In class actions, the courts evaluate the benefit to the
class of every charge assessed against the common fund, with the
result that the attorneys' private assessment of their own contributions must yield to the court's judgment on those contributions.
Instituting a review of financing arrangements as part of the
class certification process will clarify the expectations of all concerned: the attorneys, the class members, and the court. In most
complex cases, however, the court could benefit from additional
support in the oversight process. The court could appoint a guardian ad litem to a limited role of representing the class in settlement
discussions. 5 Alternatively, the court might appoint an attorney

346. See cases cited supra note 288 and accompanying text.
347. See Weinstein, supra note 157, at 525-26 ("Law firms make internal arrangments
giving greater financial rewards to rainmakers and partner-investors. I saw no reason to
prevent a similar arrangement for the committee charged with conducting the litigation.");
see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987) (citing cases in
which courts have allowed counsel to allocate fees among themselves, but reiterating
court's authority to review such agreements).
348. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7. at DR 2-106(B)(1) (listing factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee); MODEL RULES, supra note 30, at Rule
1.5(a)(1) (same).
349. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987) (requiring distribution of attorneys' fees to bear some
relation to services rendered).
350. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 4, 47 & n.139 (discussing the benefits of
appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the class). See generally Lazos, supra note 20
(arguing that a guardian ad litem is needed to protect the interests of the class in pre-trial
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to oppose the settlement in order to assist class members to organize opposition."'l The use of either type of figure- might reduce
the "rubber stamp" quality of judicial review of settlement proposals." 2 Some courts already use guardians ad litem or special masters to review fee requests.3 The Third Circuit Task Force on
attorneys' fees recommended the appointment of a "non-judicial
representative" of the class to negotiate a fee agreement with counsel early in the case."5 The guardian should be selected on the
basis of his or her skills and experience rather than through a
rotation of local attorneys or a patronage system. 5 Appointing a
guardian for the class early in the proceedings would provide the
most effective supervision of the attorneys before the case snowballed toward resolution through settlement or trial.
However, the guardian's functions should not be limited to
negotiating a fee agreement. Critical decisions are made throughout
the lawsuit, beginning with the class certification process, which
could be more effectively evaluated by the court with the aid of a
guardian. Contrary to some suggestions, the guardian would not be
a neutral observer356 but rather a partisan observer with distinct
fiduciary obligations to the class. The guardian could work with
the representative plaintiffs and class attorney to ensure that the
interests of the class as a whole, and the absent class members in

settlement negotiations).
351. See Rosenberg, supra note Ill, at 585 & n.93 (stating that, without effectively
organized opposition, courts will lack the impetus to conduct thorough reviews of proposed class settlements).
352. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 48. See also Rhode, supra note 61, at 1220
(noting the "myopic" appellate level oversight of class conflicts).
353. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 57 & nn.172-73 (discussing courts' justifications for appointing guardians and special masters); see, e.g., Kronfeld v. Transworld
Airlines, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 598, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (adopting report of Special Master on
attorneys' fee requests); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(appointing guardian ad litem for fee determination); Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 70
F.R.D. 533, 535 (D. Fla. 1976) (upholding appointment of guardian ad litem for fee determination).
354. In common fund and statutory fee'cases likely to produce a settlement fund, the
Task Force recommended that courts appoint "a non-judicial representative-who typically
will be an attorney-for the then putative fund beneficiaries, who will negotiate [a percentage fee agreement] in the usual marketplace manner and submit the proposal for the
court's approval." Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 256 (1985) (Report of
the Third Circuit Task Force).
355. Id. at 257 ("[G]reat care must be taken to avoid patronage and discrimination . . .
in the selection of negotiating representatives.").
356. See Ricciuti, supra note 19, at 846 (arguing that guardian should function as a
neutral observer).
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particular, are fully considered. A cooperative approach to the
litigation should not obscure the guardian's role as an adjunct of
the court. The guardian would not supervise the plaintiffs' attorneys per se. Rather, he or she would act as the eyes and ears of
the judge and, as appropriate, a voice for the class, throughout the
course of the litigation.
To eliminate incentives for the guardian to justify his or her
fee by obstructing settlement unnecessarily, the court should award
the guardian's fee without direct reference to the amount that the
settlement may be reduced or increased as a result of the
guardian's recommendations. One commentator suggested that a
fixed salary would reduce the guardian's incentive to prolong settlement negotiations.357 On the other hand, an hourly fee could
enhance the guardian's willingness to object to an inadequate settlement.358 As a general rule, selecting a means of payment would
seem to be something best left to the sound discretion of the court
in the circumstances of the individual case.359
Regardless of the means, the court should be wary of the fact
that ordinarily, the guardian's fee will increase the burden on the
common fund, most clearly if the guardian does not succeed in
reducing the class attorney's fee award.36 Various alternative
funding mechanisms are available. The actual cost of a guardian
could be financed by assessing a small charge against all settlement
" ' Monetary sanctions
funds secured in class actions.36
on attorneys
for filing frivolous lawsuits would be another possible source of
funds.362 The most likely candidates to pay, however, would be
the individuals with the most at stake: the plaintiffs' attorneys.

357. Lazos, supra note 20, at 331.
358. See Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1564
(1976) (arguing that a guardian should receive hourly wages to protect against inadequate
settlements).
359. In the case of its judicially-appointed fee negotiator, the Third Circuit Task Force
left the exact means of compensation up to the court. Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108
F.R.D. 237, 257 (1985) (Report of The Third Circuit Task Force).
360. Cooper & Kirkham, supra note 220, at 60. See also Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l
Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (allowing guardian's fee to be assessed against
fund). Judge Weinstein decided against the appointment of a guardian ad litem for proposed subgroups in the Agent Orange fairness hearings, on the grounds that any such
appointment would reduce the recovery available for the veterans. In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1436 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114. S. Ct. 1125
(1994).
361. Lazos, supra note 20, at 331.
362. Id.
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Forcing the plaintiff's attorneys to pay the guardian's fee can be
viewed as imposing on them an additional cost of doing business
as entrepreneurs, if not fiduciaries.36 Leaving the amount of the
fee in the court's hands would eliminate the specter of additional
conflicts of interest between the guardian and attorney. If the activities of the guardian were supervisory rather than participatory in
nature, his or her fee would not be onerous in light of the
attorney's overall recovery. 3"
In addition to financing a check on their entrepreneurial activities, the court should consider requiring the plaintiffs' counsel to
assemble and consult with a sample group of clients 365 regarding
important litigation objectives, such as settlement and appeal possi-

bilities.3" The costs of communication with a relatively small
sample would be a worthwhile tradeoff for the opportunity to
achieve some actual client input into the litigation process.367 The

363. The Third Circuit Task Force did not reach a consensus on the method of payment
for its proposed negotiating representative "but it generally was agreed that the
representative's fee and expenses should be paid by those seeking to represent the fund
claimants." Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 257 n.65. One commentator
would require the plaintiff or his attorney to post a security bond to ensure payments
regardless of whether a settlement is reached. If a settlement has been reached, the party
can be reimbursed from the common fund. Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. R v. 1318, 1564 (1976). This requirement would prove particularly
burdensome for plaintiffs' attorneys working on a contingency basis.
364. The Third Circuit Task Force recommended that the court fix limits on the compensation of the negotatior. Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 257.
365. Cf Ricciuti, supra note 19, at 853, 856 (suggesting that the attorney be required
to consult with the consultation unit as the "sole client" with the court determining the
weight to be assigned to class preferences). Ricciuti's approach requires the attorney to
make a preliminary survey of the class to assemble a representative consultation unit to
serve as the client in the case. Id. at 852-53. One advantage of the proposal, the requirement that the attorney identify any structural divisions of interest among class members,
id. at 852, arguably is covered by the option of subclasses or separate actions where
differing interests are irreconcilable. Ricciuti argues that his mechanism would be "simpler
and more efficient" than subclasses with separate representation. Id. at 853 n.196. However, the question of when a subgroup is sufficiently distinct to become a subclass remains
open. Nor is it clear how subgroup representatives can escape the problems encountered
by representative plaintiffs, see supra part III.D.I, even if more stringent consultation requirements are imposed on the class attorney. See Ricciuti, supra note 19, at 852 (describing proposed requirements on the class attorney).
366. See Ricciuti, supra note 19, at 862 (promoting the consultation unit concept, but
allowing that in some instances a guardian might be a more realistic choice for protecting
the interests of the class).
367. In a hypothetical application of his concept to the Agent Orange case, Ricciuti
suggests five subgroup representatives corresponding to the five major types of alleged
injuries: dermatalogical, systemic, neurological, oncological, and genetic, in addition to the
named representatives. Id. at 860.
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hazards of revealing confidential information could be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis by the plaintiffs' counsel, the guardian, and
the court. The sample group would not undertake the responsibilities of the named representatives, and their suggestions would not
be binding upon the attorneys. However, their sentiments would be
taken into account by the guardian in evaluating the development
of the lawsuit for the court.
V.

CONCLUSION

Investment by attorneys in complex litigation such as class
actions creates serious ethical and practical conflicts of interest in
management of a complex case. Many authorities believe such
conflicts are necessary evils in bringing meritorious cases to court
and trust that judicial supervision is the key to avoiding harm. The
Agent Orange case provides evidence that their confidence may be
misplaced.
In the Agent Orange litigation, a Plaintiffs' Management Committee dominated by investor-attorneys voted to accept a settlement
which many members of the class and the public felt was grossly
inadequate and yet which provided those attorneys with a windfall
return on money contributed for litigation expenses. The astute and
experienced district judge, knowledgeable about the plaintiffs' financial exigencies and heavily involved in the settlement, was
unaware of this agreement during the pendency of the case and for
four months after the settlement was concluded. Nonetheless, the
district judge approved the attorneys' fee arrangements.
The Second Circuit's opinion reversing the district court demonstrated strong and appropriate aversion to private investment
contracts by which attorneys can ensure a substantial profit merely
by voting for settlement. Such contracts present a clear conflict of
interest with the attorneys' clients in the class. Equally important,
this type of agreement undermines the efforts of the trial court to
apportion fees fairly and impairs the integrity of the legal profession in the eyes of the client and the public.
The practical case for allowing limited experimentation with
such contracts in future cases rests on the analogy to the relatively
unfettered division of fees within a law firm. Permitting attorneys
to reallocate fees among themselves, provided such reallocation
does not further drain the class recovery, would be acceptable if
judicial supervision were enhanced to protect the members of the
class from potential conflicts of interest. The court should require
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disclosure of all financing and compensation agreements as part of
the class certification process. Encouraging consultation of a sample
group of class members by the attorneys regarding significant decisions throughout the case is one way to enhance input and monitoting by the class itself. A professional backstop in the form of an
independent guardian ad litem appointed by the court and funded
by the plaintiffs' attorneys would be a further step toward ensuring
responsible representation by attorney-investors while protecting the
funds generated for the class. These measures will allow the courts
to experiment with financing alternatives while fulfilling their own
obligations to protect the interests of the class.
PAULA BATr WILSON

